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Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives

Williamson, Oliver E.·1991·Administrative Science Quarterly
DOI 10.2307/2393356
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Abstract

Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic organization-market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The analysis shows that the three generic forms are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to adapt to disturbances. Also, each generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law. The costeffective choice of organization form is shown to vary systematically with the attributes of transactions. The paper unifies two hitherto disjunct areas of institutional economics-the institutional environment and the institutions of governance-by treating the institutional environment as a locus of parameters, changes in which parameters bring about shifts in the comparative costs of governance. Changes in property rights, contract law, reputation effects, and uncertainty are investigated.'

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Authors
Williamson, O. E.
Corresponding author
Williamson, Oliver E.
Venue
Administrative Science Quarterly
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1991-06
Volume
36
Issue
2
Pages
269
ISSN
0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/2393356
OpenAlex
W2109280325
Cited by
7,151
References
56
Citations by year
2026: 138 · 2025: 111 · 2024: 175 · 2023: 218 · 2022: 224 · 2021: 299 · 2020: 253 · 2019: 262 · 2018: 271 · 2017: 275 · 2016: 238 · 2015: 293 · 2014: 312 · 2013: 351 · 2012: 356
FWCI
99.73
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Administrative Science Quarterly (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Outsourcing and Supply Chain Management
Keywords
market organization, hybrid organizations, hierarchy, coordination mechanisms, control mechanisms, organizational adaptation, contract law, property rights, reputation effects, uncertainty, transaction costs, governance costs, institutional environment, organizational form choice

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