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Hospital response to prospective payment: Moral hazard, selection, and practice-style effects
Open accessAbstract
In response to a change in reimbursement incentives, hospitals may change the intensity of services provided to a given set of patients, change the type (or severity) of patients they see, or change their market share. Each of these three responses, which we define as a moral hazard effect, a selection effect, and a practice-style effect, can influence average resource use in a population. We develop and implement a methodology for disentangling these effects using a panel data set of Medicaid psychiatric discharges in New Hampshire. We also find evidence for the form of quality competition hypothesized by Dranove (1987).
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ellis, R. P., & McGuire, T. G.
- Venue
- Journal of Health Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-06
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 257-277
- ISSN
- 0167-6296 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1979076383
- Cited by
- 223
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 9.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Hospital response to prospective payment: Moral hazard, selection, and practice-style effects. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0167-6296(96)00002-1
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- Ellis, R. P., & McGuire, T. G. (1996). Hospital response to prospective payment: Moral hazard, selection, and practice-style effects. Journal of Health Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6296(96)00002-1
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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