The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The perception of randomness
Open accessAbstract
Psychologists have studied people's intuitive notions of randomness by two kinds of tasks: judgment tasks (e.g., ''is this series like a coin?'' or ''which of these series is most like a coin?''), and production tasks (e.g., ''produce a series like a coin''). People's notion of randomness is biased in that they see clumps or streaks in truly random series and expect more alternation, or shorter runs, than are there. Similarly, they produce series with higher than expected alternation rates. Production tasks are subject to other biases as well, resulting from various functional limitations. The subjectively ideal random sequence obeys ''local representativeness''; namely, in short segments of it, it represents both the relative frequencies (e.g., for a coin, 50%-50%) and the irregularity (avoidance of runs and other patterns). The extent to which this bias is a handicap in the real world is addressed.
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Cites
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Cited by
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence
Griffin, D., & Tversky, A. (1992) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(92)90013-r · Cited by 1,841
Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability
Tversky, A., & Koehler, D. J. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.4.547 · Cited by 1,167
Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making
(2004) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470752937 · Cited by 961
Metadata
- Authors
- Bar-Hillel, M., & Wagenaar, W. A.
- Venue
- Advances in Applied Mathematics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1991-12
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 428-454
- ISSN
- 0196-8858 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2069739328
- Cited by
- 400
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 3.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.