The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of greed and fear of being gypped
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In the citing paper
“Dawes et al. (1986), 5 Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989), and Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1989) all find that a promised refund increases overall contributions.”
From The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign (2002) · cites this paper as Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989)
In the citing paper
“These field results are consistent with laboratory results due to Isaac et al. (1989), Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989), and Cadsby and Maynes (1999).”
From The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign (2002) · cites this paper as Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989)
Citations
Cites
Economists free ride, does anyone else?
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1981) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(81)90013-x · Cited by 1,242
Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
Isaac, R. M., & Walker, J. M. (1988) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882648 · Cited by 1,085
Dawes, R. M., McTavish, J., & Shaklee, H. (1977) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.35.1.1 · Cited by 1,032
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1979) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/226937 · Cited by 743
Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations
Isaac, R. M., Walker, J. M., & Thomas, S. H. (1984) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00140829 · Cited by 620
Public goods provision in an experimental environment
Isaac, R. M., McCue, K., & Plott, C. R. (1985) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90038-6 · Cited by 594
Estimating demand for public goods: An experiment
Böhm, P. (1972) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(72)90001-3 · Cited by 482
Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis
Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H. L. (1984) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90023-9 · Cited by 474
Research in experimental economics
(2013) · doi:10.1108/s0193-2306(2013)0000016009 · Cited by 424
The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems
van de Kragt, A. J. C., Orbell, J. M., & Dawes, R. M. (1983) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956014 · Cited by 336
Organizing Groups for Collective Action
Dawes, R. M., Orbell, J. M., Simmons, R. T., & Van De Kragt, A. J. C. (1986) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400185053 · Cited by 335
The free rider problem: Experimental evidence
Kim, O., & Walker, M. (1984) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00137902 · Cited by 302
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1980) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/227094 · Cited by 284
Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions
Smith, V. L. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.027 · Cited by 281
Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision
Taylor, M., & Ward, H. (1982) · Political Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1982.tb00545.x · Cited by 186
Incentive Compatible Experimental Processes for the Provision of Public Goods
Smith, V. L. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.025 · Cited by 118
A reparameterization of the prisoner's dilemma game
Coombs, C. H. (1973) · Systems Research and Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830180605 · Cited by 114
Free Riding and Collective Action: An Experiment in Public Microeconomics
SCHNEIDER, F. G., & Pommerehne, W. W. (1981) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1880748 · Cited by 99
Research paradigms and expected utility models for the provision of step-level public goods.
Rapoport, A. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.94.1.74 · Cited by 76
Self-citationProvision of Public Goods and the MCS Experimental Paradigm
Rapoport, A. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956124 · Cited by 71
Self-citationAn Experimental Comparison of Three Public Good Decision Mechanisms
Smith, V. L. S. (1981) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-05090-1_5 · Cited by 66
An Experimental Comparison of Three Public Good Decision Mechanisms
Smith, V. L. S. (1979) · Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3439960 · Cited by 51
Effects of greed and fear of being gypped in a social dilemma situation with changing pool size
Poppe, M., & Utens, L. (1986) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/0167-4870(86)90012-7 · Cited by 48
An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods
Ferejohn, J., Forsythe, R., Noll, R. G., & Palfrey, T. R. (1982) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · Cited by 24
Binary Games as Models of Public Goods Provision*
Hovi, J. (1986) · Scandinavian Political Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1986.tb00354.x · Cited by 14
Ferejohn, J., Forsythe, R., & Noll, R. G. (1979) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · Cited by 7
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Brubaker, 1982, Sixty-eight percent free revelation and thirty-two percent free ride? Demand disclosures under varying conditions of exclusion, Vol. 2, 151
Cited by
Sorted by citations
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
Do the Right Thing: But Only If Others Do So
Bicchieri, C., & Xiao, E. (2007) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.621 · Cited by 759
List, J. A., & Lucking‐Reiley, D. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/324392 · Cited by 535
Interpersonal Relations: Mixed-Motive Interaction
Komorita, S. S., & Parks, C. D. (1995) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.46.020195.001151 · Cited by 427
THEORIES OF COMMITMENT, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY: EVIDENCE FROM LINEAR PUBLIC GOODS GAMES
Croson, R. T. A. (2007) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2006.00006.x · Cited by 431
Metadata
- Authors
- Rapoport, A., & Eshed-Levy, D.
- Affiliations
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
- University of Haifa (IL)
- Corresponding author
- Rapoport, Amnon
- ORCID
- Rapoport, Amnon
- Venue
- Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1989-12
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 325-344
- ISSN
- 0749-5978 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2012046704
- Cited by
- 174
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 7.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- public goods provision, free-riding, greed, social dilemmas, non-cooperative behavior
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