The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of greed and fear of being gypped
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“Dawes et al. (1986), 5 Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989), and Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1989) all find that a promised refund increases overall contributions.”
From The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign (2002) · cites this paper as Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989)
In the citing paper
“These field results are consistent with laboratory results due to Isaac et al. (1989), Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989), and Cadsby and Maynes (1999).”
From The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign (2002) · cites this paper as Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rapoport, A., & Eshed-Levy, D.
- Affiliations
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
- University of Haifa (IL)
- Corresponding author
- Rapoport, Amnon
- ORCID
- Rapoport, Amnon
- Venue
- Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1989-12
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 325-344
- ISSN
- 0749-5978 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2012046704
- Cited by
- 174
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 7.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- public goods provision, free-riding, greed, social dilemmas, non-cooperative behavior
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