The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Cited by
Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior
Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1990) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555490 · Cited by 1,300
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
Greif, A., Milgrom, P., & Weingast, B. R. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261953 · Cited by 1,220
Chapter 31 Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects
Farrell, J., & Klemperer, P. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03031-7 · Cited by 1,061
Renegotiation in repeated games
Farrell, J., & Maskin, E. (1989) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(89)90021-3 · Cited by 602
The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence
Dal Bó, P., & Fréchette, G. R. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.1.411 · Cited by 495
Metadata
- Authors
- Douglas Bernheim, B., & Ray, D.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1989-12
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 295-326
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2093565303
- Cited by
- 241
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 12.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90020-1
- The paper
- Douglas Bernheim, B., & Ray, D. (1989). Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games. Games and Economic Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90020-1
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.