The DOI matches its Crossref record; 81 of the 81 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence
Abstract
A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not provide sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. To address this issue, we present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games as subjects gain experience. We show that cooperation may prevail in infinitely repeated games, but the conditions under which this occurs are more stringent than the subgame perfect conditions usually considered or even a condition based on risk dominance. (JEL C71, C73)
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Evolution and the Theory of Games
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The Theory of Learning in Games
Drew Fudenberg, B., & Levine, D. K. (1998) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 2,455
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A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in GamesPreprint
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Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
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Cited by
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Repeated Games and Reputations
Mailath, G. J., & Samuelson, L. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001 · Cited by 810
Rand, D. G. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.004 · Cited by 683
On doing relevant and rigorous experiments: Review and recommendations
Lonati, S., Quiroga, B. F., Zehnder, C., & Antonakis, J. (2018) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2018.10.003 · Cited by 354
On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey
Dal Bó, P., & Fréchette, G. R. (2018) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20160980 · Cited by 304
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Dal Bó, P., & Fréchette, G. R.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-02-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 411-429
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2056816934
- Cited by
- 495
- References
- 81
- FWCI
- 78.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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