The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
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In the citing paper
“In laboratory settings, these solutions have been studied by equipping players with auxiliary signals or actions that allow them to communicate, influence each other or self-organise, which can increase voluntary contributions towards a public good.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [14]
In the citing paper
“For example, in multiplayer games, cheap talk14,15 and onymity16 sustain reciprocation”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [14]
Citations
Cites
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Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
Kohlberg, E., & Mertens, J. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912320 · Cited by 1,431
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
Banks, J. S., & Sobel, J. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913604 · Cited by 958
Pinkham, R. S., & Wilks, S. S. (1962) · American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2311277 · Cited by 671
Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations
Isaac, R. M., Walker, J. M., & Thomas, S. H. (1984) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00140829 · Cited by 620
Multistage Games with Communication
Myerson, R. B. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913154 · Cited by 611
Public goods provision in an experimental environment
Isaac, R. M., McCue, K., & Plott, C. R. (1985) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90038-6 · Cited by 594
An Approach to Communication Equilibria
Forges, F. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914304 · Cited by 394
Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results
Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R. S., & Ross, T. W. (1989) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555734 · Cited by 369
Cited by
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Abraham, D., Ben, G., & Stephanides, M. (2021) · MUNI ECON Working Papers · doi:10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2021-02 · Cited by 3
An experimental inquiry into the nature of relational goodsPreprint
Lotito, G., Migheli, M., & Ortona, G. (2011) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1
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Casella, A. (2008) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w14487 · Cited by 1
Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods ExperimentPreprint
Güth, W., Levati, M. V., & Weiland, T. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1022036 · Cited by 1
Essays in the experimental analysis of conflict
Khan, H. (2017) · University of Birmingham Institutional Research Archive (University of Birmingham) · Cited by 1
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Daniel Mochon, B. (2008) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
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McConnell, M. A. (2010) · CaltechTHESIS (California Institute of Technology) · doi:10.7907/zp35-gr57
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Iwasa, Y. (2006) · Ecological Research · doi:10.1007/s11284-006-0069-x
Takahashi, H., Ogawa, K., & Futamura, H. (2014) · Proceedings in adaptation, learning and optimization · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13359-1_32
Essays on the Economics of Communication
Makarov, U. (2011)
Essays on Pure and Applied Game Theory
Chang, J.-W. (2016) · eScholarship (California Digital Library)
Voluntary Participation in Coaseian Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation
Hong, F., & Lim, W. (2012) · PsycEXTRA Dataset · doi:10.1037/e629522012-070
Co-operatives as an alternative distribution system for local food and community development
Berge, S. T. (2015) · The Atrium (University of Guelph)
DELIBERATIVE AND NON-DELIBERATIVE PROCESSES IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION
Cappelletti, D. (2009)
Bolle, F., & Otto, P. E. (2021) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-021-00916-8
Essays in Behavioural and Experimental Economics: Emotions, Uncertainty and Cooperation
Marini, M. M. (2019) · Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa (Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya) · doi:10.6035/14102.2019.647154
Should the Talk be Cheap in Contribution Games?
Chang, J.-W. (2020) · The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics · doi:10.1515/bejte-2019-0082
Coordinating to avoid the catastrophe
Bühl, V., & Schmidt, R. C. (2024) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102977
Coordinating Public Good Provision by Mediated Communication
Halonen-Akatwijuka, M., & Park, I. (2021) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20180272
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Srivastava, V. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4008305
Teams Versus Individuals in Pre-Play Cheap Talk CommunicationPreprint
Yang, H., Ye, Z., & Zhang, L. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4604762
Crowdsourcing Digital Public Goods: A Field Experiment on Metadata ContributionsPreprint
Li, L., Chen, Y., Levenstein, M. C., & Vilhuber, L. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5008203 · Cited by 1
Teams versus individuals in pre-play cheap talk communication
Yang, H., Ye, Z., & Zhang, L. (2024) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2024.102325
Institution formation in weakest-link games
Caparrós, A., Blanco, E., & Finus, M. (2025) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106943
Glas, J. M. (2022) · Digital Archive @ GSU · doi:10.57709/7332968
Metadata
- Authors
- Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1991-05
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 183-220
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1965142293
- Cited by
- 127
- References
- 25
- Citations by year
- 2025: 3 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 13.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- cheap talk, public goods game, private information, costly communication, equilibrium model, simultaneous moves, voluntary contributions, experimental economics
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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