The DOI matches its Crossref record; 81 of the 82 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Open accessAbstract
This paper considers communication in terms of inference about the behaviour of others (and our own behaviour). It is based on the premise that our sensations are largely generated by other agents like ourselves. This means, we are trying to infer how our sensations are caused by others, while they are trying to infer our behaviour: for example, in the dialogue between two speakers. We suggest that the infinite regress induced by modelling another agent - who is modelling you - can be finessed if you both possess the same model. In other words, the sensations caused by others and oneself are generated by the same process. This leads to a view of communication based upon a narrative that is shared by agents who are exchanging sensory signals. Crucially, this narrative transcends agency - and simply involves intermittently attending to and attenuating sensory input. Attending to sensations enables the shared narrative to predict the sensations generated by another (i.e. to listen), while attenuating sensory input enables one to articulate the narrative (i.e. to speak). This produces a reciprocal exchange of sensory signals that, formally, induces a generalised synchrony between internal (neuronal) brain states generating predictions in both agents. We develop the arguments behind this perspective, using an active (Bayesian) inference framework and offer some simulations (of birdsong) as proof of principle.
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“This brings with it an extra inference problem; namely, the attribution of agency. In other words, if we use the same models to explain our own behavior and the observed consequences of another’s behavior, then we also have to carefully infer agency (in order to appropriately attenuate proprioceptive precision and preclude echopraxia, Friston and Frith, 2015).”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Friston and Frith, 2015
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Cites
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
Rao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1999) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/4580 · Cited by 5,483
The weak coherence account: detail-focused cognitive style in autism spectrum disorders
Happé, F., & Frith, U. (2006) · Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders · doi:10.1007/s10803-005-0039-0 · Cited by 2,884
Canonical Microcircuits for Predictive Coding
Bastos, A. M., Usrey, W. M., Adams, R. A., Mangun, G. R., Fries, P., & Friston, K. J. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.038 · Cited by 2,421 · cited 1×
“In a companion paper (Friston & Frith, 2015), we demonstrate how communication facilitates long-term changes in generative models that are trying to predict each other.”
BackgroundSelf-citationHohwy, J. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001 · Cited by 1,914
Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution
Jackendoff, R. S. (2002) · Cited by 1,858
Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816 · cited 1×
“A particularly interesting issue here is interoceptive inference (Seth, 2013), and how visual cues about the emotional states of others can be interpreted in relation to generative models of our own interoceptive cues: see (Kanaya, Matsushima, & Yokosawa, 2012).”
BackgroundPredictive coding under the free-energy principle
Friston, K., & Kiebel, S. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0300 · Cited by 1,579
Self-citationHierarchical Bayesian inference in the visual cortex
Lee, T. S., & Mumford, D. (2003) · Journal of the Optical Society of America A · doi:10.1364/josaa.20.001434 · Cited by 1,473 · cited 3×
“…been formalised in recent decades to cover deep or hierarchical Bayesian inference – about the causes of our sensations – and how these inferences induce beliefs, movement and behaviour (Clark, 2013b; Dayan, Hinton, & Neal, 1995; Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006; Hohwy, 2013; Lee & Mumford, 2003).”
BackgroundPerceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia
Fletcher, P. C., & Frith, C. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2536 · Cited by 1,462
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1 of the 82 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
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- Clark, 2013, The many faces of precision, Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 270
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Ramstead, M. J. D., Veissière, S. P. L., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01090 · Cited by 422
Vuust, P., Heggli, O. A., Friston, K. J., & Kringelbach, M. L. (2022) · Nature reviews. Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00578-5 · Cited by 473
Self-citationCentrality of social interaction in human brain function.
Hari, R., Henriksson, L., Malinen, S., & Parkkonen, L. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.022 · Cited by 370
Bruineberg, J., Kiverstein, J., & Rietveld, E. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1239-1 · Cited by 383
Active Inference, Curiosity and Insight
Friston, K. J., Lin, M., Frith, C., Pezzulo, G., Hobson, J. A., & Ondobaka, S. (2017) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_00999 · Cited by 372
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Metadata
- Authors
- Friston, K., & Frith, C.
- Affiliations
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Friston, Karl
- ORCID
- Friston, Karl
- Venue
- Consciousness and Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2015-11
- Volume
- 36
- Pages
- 390-405
- ISSN
- 1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC4553904
- OpenAlex
- W2024149692
- Cited by
- 359
- References
- 82
- Citations by year
- 2026: 44 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 41 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 5
- FWCI
- 16.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (091593, 088130)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Keywords
- communication, joint action, shared narratives, Bayesian inference, infinite regress, shared models, sensory prediction, attention, attenuation, bird song, social cognition
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Attention, Communication, Humans, Models, Theoretical, Perception, Sensation, Thinking, Theory of Mind
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