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The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective

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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 90 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

In this paper, we argue for a theoretical separation of the free-energy principle from Helmholtzian accounts of the predictive brain. The free-energy principle is a theoretical framework capturing the imperative for biological self-organization in information-theoretic terms. The free-energy principle has typically been connected with a Bayesian theory of predictive coding, and the latter is often taken to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception as unconscious inference. If our interpretation is right, however, a Helmholtzian view of perception is incompatible with Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle. We argue that the free energy principle and the ecological and enactive approach to mind and life make for a much happier marriage of ideas. We make our argument based on three points. First we argue that the free energy principle applies to the whole animal-environment system, and not only to the brain. Second, we show that active inference, as understood by the free-energy principle, is incompatible with unconscious inference understood as analagous to scientific hypothesis-testing, the main tenet of a Helmholtzian view of perception. Third, we argue that the notion of inference at work in Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle is too weak to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception. Taken together these points imply that the free energy principle is best understood in ecological and enactive terms set out in this paper.

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Crossref · 10.1007/s11229-016-1239-1

Cites

86 of 86 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Figures

Fig. 1 Schematic depiction of how free-energy is composed of divergence and embodied surprisal (suprisalE) and how these components change with perceptual and active inference respectively (see text). Perceptual inference can only reduce divergence, but not embodied surprisal. Only active inference can reduce embodied surprisal
Fig. 1 Schematic depiction of how free-energy is composed of divergence and embodied surprisal (suprisalE) and how these components change with perceptual and active inference respectively (see text). Perceptual inference can only reduce divergence, but not embodied surprisal. Only active inference can reduce embodied surprisalCC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 2 Left A domino chain reaction as an exemplificiation of a Markov process. Every domino is only dependent on its previous domino, just as, in the figure on the right, every node is only dependent on its neighboring nodes. Right A schematic depiction of a Markov blanket, a spatial generalization of a Markov process. The gray circle represents the Markov blanket of a node, consisting of internal state (int), its children (the action states, act), its parents (sen), and parents of children (sen), with parent/child being understood in terms of cause/effect
Fig. 2 Left A domino chain reaction as an exemplificiation of a Markov process. Every domino is only dependent on its previous domino, just as, in the figure on the right, every node is only dependent on its neighboring nodes. Right A schematic depiction of a Markov blanket, a spatial generalization of a Markov process. The gray circle represents the Markov blanket of a node, consisting of internal state (int), its children (the action states, act), its parents (sen), and parents of children (sen), with parent/child being understood in terms of cause/effectCC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 3 Original drawing from Huygens’ C. Horoloqium Oscilatorium. Two oscillating clocks hanging on a suspension beam that is itself able to move
Fig. 3 Original drawing from Huygens’ C. Horoloqium Oscilatorium. Two oscillating clocks hanging on a suspension beam that is itself able to moveCC BY · PubMed Central

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Citations

Cites

Show all 86 references

Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Dewey, J. (1976). Lectures on psychological and political ethics: 1898. New York: Hafner Press. (Edited with an introduction by D. L. Koch).
  2. Friston, K. (2011). Embodied inference: Or “I think therefore I am, if I am what I think.”. In W. Tschacher & C. Bergomi (Eds.), The implications of embodiment (cognition and communication) (pp. 89–125). Exeter: Imprint Academic.
  3. Helmholtz, H. (1860/1962). Handbuch der physiologischen optik (Southall, J. P. C. (Ed.), English trans.), Vol. 3. New York: Dover.
  4. Huygens, C. (1673) C. Horoloqium Oscilatorium (Apud F. Muquet, Parisiis, 1673); English translation: The pendulum clock (Iowa State University Press, Ames)
  5. Murphy, K. (2012). Machine learning: A probabilistic approach. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  6. Port, R. F., & Van Gelder, T. (1995). Mind as motion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Bruineberg, J., Kiverstein, J., & Rietveld, E.
Affiliations
  • University of Amsterdam (NL)
  • Amsterdam University Medical Centers (NL)
  • Amsterdam UMC Location University of Amsterdam (NL)
Corresponding author
Bruineberg, Jelle
Venue
Synthese
Published
2016-10-21
Volume
195
Issue
6
Pages
2417-2444
ISSN
  • 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0964
OpenAlex
W2534098824
Cited by
383
References
90
Citations by year
2026: 18 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 57 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 66 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 46 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 1
FWCI
22.70
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Pure Amsterdam UMC (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Pure Amsterdam UMC (submittedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
  • NWO (276-20-019)
  • European Research Council (ERC-StG679190)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
free energy principle, active inference, predictive coding, unconscious inference, Bayesian inference, self-organization, hypothesis testing, perception

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11229-016-1239-1
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Bruineberg, J., Kiverstein, J., & Rietveld, E. (2018). The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1239-1

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