The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 90 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this paper, we argue for a theoretical separation of the free-energy principle from Helmholtzian accounts of the predictive brain. The free-energy principle is a theoretical framework capturing the imperative for biological self-organization in information-theoretic terms. The free-energy principle has typically been connected with a Bayesian theory of predictive coding, and the latter is often taken to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception as unconscious inference. If our interpretation is right, however, a Helmholtzian view of perception is incompatible with Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle. We argue that the free energy principle and the ecological and enactive approach to mind and life make for a much happier marriage of ideas. We make our argument based on three points. First we argue that the free energy principle applies to the whole animal-environment system, and not only to the brain. Second, we show that active inference, as understood by the free-energy principle, is incompatible with unconscious inference understood as analagous to scientific hypothesis-testing, the main tenet of a Helmholtzian view of perception. Third, we argue that the notion of inference at work in Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle is too weak to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception. Taken together these points imply that the free energy principle is best understood in ecological and enactive terms set out in this paper.
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“Ecological psychology and the FEP have often been framed as competing frameworks for cognitive science (Bruineberg et al., 2022; though for an argument to the contrary, see Bruineberg et al., 2018), given that the former rejects representational notions, and the latter relies on them extensively.”
From A potential mechanism for Gibsonian resonance: behavioral entrainment emerges from local homeostasis in an unsupervised reservoir network (2024) · cites this paper as Bruineberg et al., 2018
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Cites
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception
Bornstein, M. H., & Gibson, J. J. (1980) · The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism · doi:10.2307/429816 · Cited by 22,935 · cited 1×
“…2000),metastability (Kelso2012; Rabinovich et al. 2008), autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980; but see Kirchhoff (2016)) and ecological psychology (Gibson 1979).5 Not all of this work is theoretically consistent with a Helmholtzian theory of perception, some of it is even explicitly aimed against…”
Background(1988) · Cited by 16,582
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition
Gibson, J. J. (2014) · doi:10.4324/9781315740218 · Cited by 12,132
Journal of Consciousness Studies
(2022) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201 · Cited by 6,832
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 10×
“30 The recent literature (Clark 2013) on Helmholtzian interpretations of predictive processing contains a number of commentaries from enactivists that overlap with the arguments of this paper in suggestive ways.”
BackgroundInfluentialAutopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1980) · Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4 · Cited by 5,815
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
Rao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1999) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/4580 · Cited by 5,483
Intelligence without representation
Brooks, R. A. (1991) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(91)90053-m · Cited by 4,853 · cited 1×
“…the conclusion that, because of the organism’s skills and affordance-related states of action readiness, the organism itself is its own best model of the causal structure of its niche, a paradoxical sounding twist on the familiar embodied theme that “the world is its own best model” (Brooks 1991).”
BackgroundThe brainweb: phase synchronization and large-scale integration
Varela, F., Lachaux, J.-P., Rodriguez, E., & Martinerie, J. (2001) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/35067550 · Cited by 4,761 · cited 1×
“Phenomena like entrainment and synchronization seem to play a crucial role in brain functioning (Varela et al. 2001; Engel et al. 2001).”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- Dewey, J. (1976). Lectures on psychological and political ethics: 1898. New York: Hafner Press. (Edited with an introduction by D. L. Koch).
- Friston, K. (2011). Embodied inference: Or “I think therefore I am, if I am what I think.”. In W. Tschacher & C. Bergomi (Eds.), The implications of embodiment (cognition and communication) (pp. 89–125). Exeter: Imprint Academic.
- Helmholtz, H. (1860/1962). Handbuch der physiologischen optik (Southall, J. P. C. (Ed.), English trans.), Vol. 3. New York: Dover.
- Huygens, C. (1673) C. Horoloqium Oscilatorium (Apud F. Muquet, Parisiis, 1673); English translation: The pendulum clock (Iowa State University Press, Ames)
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Cited by
The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle
Kirchhoff, M., Parr, T., Palacios, E., Friston, K., & Kiverstein, J. (2018) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0792 · Cited by 473
Self-citationAnswering Schrödinger's question: A free-energy formulation
Ramstead, M. J. D., Badcock, P. B., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2017.09.001 · Cited by 354
“This inferential aspect leads us to notions like embodied inference [44,45], the Bayesian brain [46], the Bayesian cell [27], and even a Bayesian culture [29,47].”
Generalised free energy and active inference
Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2019) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/s00422-019-00805-w · Cited by 236
A tale of two densities: active inference is enactive inference
Ramstead, M. J., Kirchhoff, M. D., & Friston, K. J. (2020) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712319862774 · Cited by 220
“As such, generative models are more about the control and regulation of action than they are about figuring out what is ‘out there’ beyond the veil of sensory impressions, and representing the world (Anderson, 2017; Bruineberg et al., 2016).”
BackgroundActive inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition
Gallagher, S., & Allen, M. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1269-8 · Cited by 214
“On the one hand, it has been argued, the general framework of the predictive model (specifically the free-energy principle, and the concept of active inference) is consistent with autopoietic enactivist views (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg et al. 2016; Kirchhoff 2016).”
Result
Metadata
- Authors
- Bruineberg, J., Kiverstein, J., & Rietveld, E.
- Affiliations
- University of Amsterdam (NL)
- Amsterdam University Medical Centers (NL)
- Amsterdam UMC Location University of Amsterdam (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Bruineberg, Jelle
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2016-10-21
- Volume
- 195
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2417-2444
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- PMC
- PMC6438652
- OpenAlex
- W2534098824
- Cited by
- 383
- References
- 90
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 57 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 66 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 46 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 22.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Pure Amsterdam UMC (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Pure Amsterdam UMC (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- NWO (276-20-019)
- European Research Council (ERC-StG679190)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- free energy principle, active inference, predictive coding, unconscious inference, Bayesian inference, self-organization, hypothesis testing, perception
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