Insider-threat detection using Gaussian Mixture Models and Sensitivity Profiles
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The insider threat is one of the most challenging problems to detect due to its complex nature and significant impact on organisations. Insiders pose a great threat on organisations due to their knowledge on the organisation and its security protocols, their authorised access to the organisation’s resources, and the difficulty of discerning the behaviour of an insider threat from a normal employee’s behavior (Gheyas and Abdallah, 2016). As a result, the insider-threat field faces the challenge of developing detection solutions that are able to detect threats without generating a great number of false positives, and are able to take into consideration the non-technical aspect of the problem. This paper introduces a novel automated anomaly detection method that uses Gaussian Mixture Models for modelling the normal behaviour of employees to detect anomalous behaviour that may be malicious. The paper also introduces a novel approach to insider-threat detection that capitalises on the knowledge of security experts during analysis using visual analytics and sensitivity profiles which is a novel approach to re-contextualise detection output by considering outside, qualitative, non-technical factors that analysts may be privy to, but not the detection method. A feasibility study with experts in threat detection was conducted to evaluate the detection performance of the proposed solution and its usability. The results demonstrate the success of designing a solution that builds on the knowledge of security experts during analysis and reduces the number of false positives generated by automated anomaly detection. The work presented in the paper also demonstrates the potential of introducing more methods for capitialising on the knowledge of security experts to improve the false negative rate, and the potential of designing sensitivity profiles.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Bostock, M., Ogievetsky, V., & Heer, J. (2011) · IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics · doi:10.1109/tvcg.2011.185 · Cited by 3,165
Understanding Insider Threat: A Framework for Characterising Attacks
Nurse, J. R. C., Buckley, O., Legg, P. A., Goldsmith, M., Creese, S., Wright, G. R. T., & Whitty, M. (2014) · 2014 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2014.38 · Cited by 212 · cited 5×
“The profiles are informally described as follows: • Negative organisation change : negative changes in organisations impacting the jobs of employees, such as lay-o ff s and reduction in wages, are a common catalyst for insider attacks [2, 11, 12, 8].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialA New Take on Detecting Insider Threats: Exploring the Use of Hidden Markov Models
Rashid, T., Agrafiotis, I., & Nurse, J. R. C. (2016) · Proceedings of the 8th ACM CCS International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats · doi:10.1145/2995959.2995964 · Cited by 152 · cited 4×
“Each employee is represented by a GMM that is trained during a period assumed to represent the employee’s normal behaviour [22, 21].”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Cited by
Behavioral Based Insider Threat Detection Using Deep Learning
Nasir, R., Afzal, M., Latif, R., & Iqbal, W. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3118297 · Cited by 146
“12 [31] Only 15% of the CMU dataset was used for evaluating the model 13 [11] Proposed scheme looks complex and time intensive.”
MethodEmployee profiling via aspect-based sentiment and network for insider threats detection
Soh, C., Yu, S., Narayanan, A., Duraisamy, S., & Chen, L. (2019) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2019.05.043 · Cited by 61
Al-Shehari, T., & Alsowail, R. A. (2023) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-022-00651-1 · Cited by 25
A Proposed Approach to Analyze Insider Threat Detection Using Emails
Mittal, A., & Garg, U. (2022) · 2022 3rd International Conference on Computation, Automation and Knowledge Management (ICCAKM) · doi:10.1109/iccakm54721.2022.9990361 · Cited by 8
Integrating Human Factors into Insider Threat Detection – A Systematic Review
Pathirana, N., Roberts, R., Kalutarage, H., & McDermott, C. D. (2026) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3798089 · Cited by 1
“[47] Uses Gaussian Mixture Models and sensitivity proiles for anomaly detection and reduced false positives.”
Metadata
- Authors
- tabash, K. A., & Happa, J.
- Venue
- Computers & Security
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2018-08
- Volume
- 77
- Pages
- 838-859
- ISSN
- 0167-4048 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2795060553
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 4.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.