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Cited by 146Corruption and Economic DevelopmentExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesTaxation and Compliance Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

A controlled field experiment on corruption

Armantier, Olivier, Boly, Amadou·2011·European Economic Review
DOI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.007
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Crossref · 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.007

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Metadata

Authors
Armantier, O., & Boly, A.
Affiliations
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York (US)
  • United Nations Industrial Development Organization (AT)
Corresponding author
Armantier, Olivier
ORCID
Venue
European Economic Review
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2011-12
Volume
55
Issue
8
Pages
1072-1082
ISSN
0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.007
OpenAlex
W2007950074
Cited by
146
References
48
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 3
FWCI
22.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
Keywords
corruption, bribery, wage effects, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation, deterrence, religiosity, causes of corruption, field experiments

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