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Cited by 29Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationGame Theory and Voting SystemsFiscal Policies and Political Economy

Is polarization bad?

Testa, Cecilia·2012·European Economic Review
DOI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.04.005
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  • Higher levels of ideological polarization increase the ideological costs of corruption and thus decrease the prevalence of corruption.

    “Secondly, supposing that politicians care about both rents from corruption and ideology and that engaging in corruption reduces their chances for reelection, higher levels of ideological polarization increase the (ideological) costs of corruption and thus decrease the prevalence of corruption (Melki & Pickering, 2020;Testa, 2012).”

    From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Testa, 2012

  • Ideological differences boost political competition and may thereby contribute to accountability and lower corruption.

    “Ideological differences boost political competition and may thereby also contribute to accountability and lower corruption (Brown et al., 2011;Testa, 2012).”

    From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Testa, 2012

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Authors
Testa, C.
Affiliations
Royal Holloway University of London (GB)
Corresponding author
Testa, Cecilia
ORCID
Testa, Cecilia
Venue
European Economic Review
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2012-08
Volume
56
Issue
6
Pages
1104-1118
ISSN
0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.04.005
OpenAlex
W2001661566
Cited by
29
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2017: 1 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 2
FWCI
10.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
  • European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
European Commission—DG Research Sixth Framework Programme (CIT-2-CT-2004-506084)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
Keywords
political polarization, social polarization, government quality, electoral stakes, political corruption, political parties, electoral competition, policy quality, social diversity

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