Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation
Open accessAbstract
Despite the centrality of the median voter prediction in political economy models, overwhelming empirical evidence shows that legislators regularly take positions that diverge significantly from the preferences of the median voter in their districts. However, all these empirical studies to date lack the necessary data to directly measure the preferences of the median voter. We utilize a unique data set consisting of individual‐level voting data that allows us to construct direct measures of voter preferences. We find that legislators are most constrained by the preferences of the median voter in homogeneous districts.
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Other methods for scaling political actors rely on particular disclosure institutions that are often absent in other democracies.
“Other methods for scaling political actors have been developed (e.g., Gerber and Lewis 2004;Bonica 2011), but they rely on particular disclosure institutions that are often absent in other democracies.”
From Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts (2013) · cites this paper as Gerber and Lewis 2004
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“6 Previous research on congruence has estimated í µí±í µí± í µí±í µí± and í µí±í µí± í µí±í µí± * as points on the real line based on a sample of votes ---roll call votes for legislators and some sort of district-level election returns for constituents (following Gerber and Lewis (2004)).”
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“In contrast to this, by allo- 10This is also increasingly supported by empirical evidence, see, e.g., Pommerehne (1978), Peltzman (1992) or, more recently, Gerber and Lewis (2004).”
ResultA Gender Gap in Party Congruence and Responsiveness?
Ferland, B. (2019) · Politics & Gender · doi:10.1017/s1743923x18000818 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Ideological extremism and electoral design. Multimember versus single member districts
Bertelli, A. M., & Richardson, L. E. (2008) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9332-8 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
“House elections. Using voter data, Gerber and Lewis (2004) find that legislators are most constrained to the median voter in homogeneous districts.”
Constituency Size and Evaluations of Government
Bowen, D. C. (2021) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/lsq.12358 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
- Authors
- Gerber, E. R., & Lewis, J. B.
- Affiliations
- University of Michigan (US)
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2004-12
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1364-1383
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2020731668
- Cited by
- 324
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 36 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 14
- FWCI
- 32.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
- Keywords
- median voter, political representation, voter preferences, legislative behavior
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