Cited by 324Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationGame Theory and Voting SystemsFiscal Policies and Political Economy

Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation

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Gerber, Elisabeth R., Lewis, Jeffrey B.·2004·Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

Despite the centrality of the median voter prediction in political economy models, overwhelming empirical evidence shows that legislators regularly take positions that diverge significantly from the preferences of the median voter in their districts. However, all these empirical studies to date lack the necessary data to directly measure the preferences of the median voter. We utilize a unique data set consisting of individual‐level voting data that allows us to construct direct measures of voter preferences. We find that legislators are most constrained by the preferences of the median voter in homogeneous districts.

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Crossref · 10.1086/424737

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  • Other methods for scaling political actors rely on particular disclosure institutions that are often absent in other democracies.

    “Other methods for scaling political actors have been developed (e.g., Gerber and Lewis 2004;Bonica 2011), but they rely on particular disclosure institutions that are often absent in other democracies.”

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Authors
Gerber, E. R., & Lewis, J. B.
Affiliations
  • University of Michigan (US)
  • University of California, Los Angeles (US)
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
2004-12
Volume
112
Issue
6
Pages
1364-1383
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W2020731668
Cited by
324
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 36 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 14
FWCI
32.28
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
Keywords
median voter, political representation, voter preferences, legislative behavior

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