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Cited by 19Corruption and Economic DevelopmentElectoral Systems and Political ParticipationPolitical Influence and Corporate Strategies

Polarization and corruption in America

Melki, Mickael, Pickering, Andrew·2020·European Economic Review
DOI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103397
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  • If the ideological distance between parties is large, it is less likely that they will be in a coalition in the future, so politicians are more incentivized to expose the corrupt practices of opposing parties.

    “If the ideological distance between parties is large, it is less likely that they will be in a coalition in the future.Therefore, politicians are more incentivized to expose the corrupt practices of the opposing parties (Brown et al., 2011;Melki & Pickering, 2020).”

    From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Melki & Pickering, 2020

    Section 2 (“Hypothesis”; page unavailable) says that ideologically distinct opposition politicians more readily hold incumbents to account and that ideological proximity can facilitate collusion in corruption. It does not give the claimed explanation that distant parties are less likely to form a future coalition, or specifically say that politicians are more likely to expose opponents’ corrupt practices. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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  • Higher levels of ideological polarization increase the ideological costs of corruption and thus decrease the prevalence of corruption.

    “Secondly, supposing that politicians care about both rents from corruption and ideology and that engaging in corruption reduces their chances for reelection, higher levels of ideological polarization increase the (ideological) costs of corruption and thus decrease the prevalence of corruption (Melki & Pickering, 2020;Testa, 2012).”

    From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Melki & Pickering, 2020

  • The mechanisms by which ideological polarization may reduce corruption received broad empirical support from country-level panel analyses, a state-level panel analysis from the United States, and an interview-based cross-sectional analysis focusing on Latin American countries.

    “These mechanisms received broad empirical support from countrylevel panel analyses (Brown et al., 2011;Testa, 2010), a statelevel panel analysis from the United States (Melki & Pickering, 2020), and an interviewbased crosssectional analysis focusing on Latin American countries (Davis et al., 2004).”

    From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Melki & Pickering, 2020

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Research works printed but not linked: 32

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Authors
Melki, M., & Pickering, A.
Affiliations
University of York (GB)
Corresponding author
Pickering, Andrew
ORCID
Pickering, Andrew
Venue
European Economic Review
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2020-05
Volume
124
Pages
103397
ISSN
0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103397
OpenAlex
W2505143268
Cited by
19
References
1
Citations by year
2021: 8 · 2020: 11
FWCI
6.35
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
  • European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Keywords
political corruption, ideological polarization, state politics, case quality, ethics law, redistricting commissions, anti-corruption measures, United States states

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