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Cited by 145Corruption and Economic DevelopmentNatural Resources and Economic DevelopmentPolitical Conflict and Governance

Political Polarization as a Constraint on Corruption: A Cross-national Comparison

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Brown, David S., Touchton, Michael, Whitford, Andrew·2011·World Development
DOI 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.02.006
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Abstract

Efforts to explain corruption have increased dramatically in recent years. The interest stems from the increasing weight economists assign to corruption when explaining economic growth. A great deal of the research focuses on how political institutions influence perceptions of corruption. We move this debate in a new direction by addressing a previously ignored dimension: ideological polarization. We contend perceptions of corruption are determined not only by specific institutional features of the political system—such as elements of voting systems, ballot structures, or separation of powers—but by who sits at the controls. We employ panel data from a broad variety of countries to test our theoretical argument. Contrary to recent findings by both economists and political scientists, we show that ideological polarization predicts perceptions of corruption.

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  • If the ideological distance between parties is large, it is less likely that they will be in a coalition in the future, so politicians are more incentivized to expose the corrupt practices of opposing parties.

    “If the ideological distance between parties is large, it is less likely that they will be in a coalition in the future.Therefore, politicians are more incentivized to expose the corrupt practices of the opposing parties (Brown et al., 2011;Melki & Pickering, 2020).”

    From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Brown et al., 2011

  • The mechanisms by which ideological polarization may reduce corruption received broad empirical support from country-level panel analyses, a state-level panel analysis from the United States, and an interview-based cross-sectional analysis focusing on Latin American countries.

    “These mechanisms received broad empirical support from countrylevel panel analyses (Brown et al., 2011;Testa, 2010), a statelevel panel analysis from the United States (Melki & Pickering, 2020), and an interviewbased crosssectional analysis focusing on Latin American countries (Davis et al., 2004).”

    From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Brown et al., 2011

  • Ideological differences boost political competition and may thereby contribute to accountability and lower corruption.

    “Ideological differences boost political competition and may thereby also contribute to accountability and lower corruption (Brown et al., 2011;Testa, 2012).”

    From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Brown et al., 2011

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Authors
Brown, D. S., Touchton, M., & Whitford, A.
Affiliations
  • University of Colorado Boulder (US)
  • Boise State University (US)
  • University of Georgia (US)
ORCID
Venue
World Development
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2011-09
Volume
39
Issue
9
Pages
1516-1529
ISSN
0305-750X (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.02.006
OpenAlex
W1969318045
Cited by
129
References
60
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 2
FWCI
12.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • World Development (publishedVersion)
  • Scholar Works (Boise State University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
Keywords
political polarization, corruption, corruption perception, ideological polarization, political institutions, economic growth, electoral systems, ballot structure, separation of powers, cross-national comparison

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