The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model
Vondrak, J. (2008) · Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing · doi:10.1145/1374376.1374389 · Cited by 546
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Li, S. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20160425 · Cited by 439
Online Matching and Ad Allocation
Mehta, A. (2010) · Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1561/0400000057 · Cited by 387
Edge Computing Framework for Cooperative Video Processing in Multimedia IoT Systems
Long, C., Cao, Y., Jiang, T., & Zhang, Q. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Multimedia · doi:10.1109/tmm.2017.2764330 · Cited by 222
Metadata
- Authors
- Lehmann, B., Lehmann, D., & Nisan, N.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 270-296
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2962711478
- Cited by
- 471
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 23.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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