The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender–receiver game
Open accessAbstract
A recent experimental study of Cai and Wang on strategic information transmission games reveals that subjects tend to transmit more information than predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis. To evidence that this overcommunication phenomenon can be explained in some situations in terms of a tension between normative social behavior and incentives for lying, we show that in a simple sender-receiver game subjects incurring in costs to punish liars tell the truth more often than predicted by the equilibrium analysis whereas subjects that do not punish liars after receiving a deceptive message play equilibrium strategies. Thus, we can partition the subject pool into two groups, one group of subjects with preferences for truth-telling and another group taking into account only economic incentives.
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Cites
Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2 · Cited by 4,970
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk
Duffy, J., & Feltovich, N. (2002) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2001.0892 · Cited by 218
Cited by
LIES IN DISGUISE-AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON CHEATING
Fischbacher, U., & Föllmi-Heusi, F. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12014 · Cited by 1,243
Erat, S., & Gneezy, U. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1449 · Cited by 698
MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY
de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2015) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/iere.12141 · Cited by 15
Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation
Duffy, S., Hartwig, T., & Smith, J. (2014) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-013-9380-5 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Sánchez-Pagés, S., & Vorsatz, M.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-10
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 86-112
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2004465863
- Cited by
- 228
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 24.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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