CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 213Sharing Economy and PlatformsDigital Platforms and EconomicsService and Product Innovation

The sharing economy and the future of the hotel industry: Transaction cost theory and platform economics

Open access
Akbar, Yusaf H., Tracogna, Andrea·2018·International Journal of Hospitality Management
DOI 10.1016/j.ijhm.2017.12.004
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.ijhm.2017.12.004

Cites

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Platforms have both highly heterogeneous peer-provided assets and user needs.

    “platforms have both highly heterogeneous peer-provided assets and user needs”

    From Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy (2019) · cites this paper as Akbar and Tracogna, 2018

    Section 2.1 describes platforms as increasing the variety of products or services, and Section 3 identifies peer providers who share assets, resources, time or skills. The Asset/Product Specificity section discusses tailoring offerings to the needs of a broader community of customers. These passages support variety on both sides, but do not establish that peer-provided assets and user needs are *highly* heterogeneous. (LLM, conf=0.76)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • The minimum viable platform size is determined by the nature of the network effects linking the platform's two or more-sided markets, the heterogeneity of assets and "tastes" of the actors, and equilibrium dynamics between service providers and users that allow stakeholder utilities to be maximized at a given price.

    “This minimum viable platform size is determined by the nature of the network effects linking the platform's two or more-sided markets, the heterogeneity of assets and “tastes” of the actors (Akbar and Tracogna, 2018;Evans and Schmalensee, 2010), and equilibrium dynamics between service providers and users that allow stakeholder utilities to be maximized at a given price (Evans and Schmalensee, 201”

    From Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy (2019) · cites this paper as Akbar and Tracogna, 2018

    Section 2.1, “The economics of platforms” (page unavailable), says platform owners need to reach a minimum viable size and describes same-side and cross-side network effects. The paper also discusses asset specificity, but the passages do not establish that heterogeneity of assets or actors’ “tastes” determines that minimum size. The equilibrium-and-utility clause is cited to Evans and Schmalensee, not to this paper. (LLM, conf=0.83)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Governance mechanisms on sharing platforms include pre-selection of assets and complementors, rating systems, platform contracts and payment management, rules and standards regarding service levels, and insurance and guarantees.

    “Governance mechanisms on sharing platforms include (Akbar and Tracogna, 2018): pre-selection of assets, other resources and complementors that can be accessed through the platform”

    From Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy (2019) · cites this paper as Akbar and Tracogna, 2018

    Section 3 and Table 2 list pre-selection of assets or products, rating and feedback systems, platform contracts and payment management, service-level standards, and insurance and guarantees. They do not identify pre-selection of complementors as a governance mechanism; providing complementary products or services is a separate mechanism. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Risk and uncertainty in peer-to-peer transactions are mitigated through instilling and managing trust via institutional and legal governance mechanisms.

    “risk and uncertainty are mitigated through instilling and managing trust via institutional and legal governance mechanisms”

    From Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy (2019) · cites this paper as Akbar and Tracogna, 2018

    Section 4 (Propositions development; page unavailable) says platform owners reassure users facing uncertain transactions by adopting integration mechanisms. Section 3 describes reputation-building as a way to establish trust, and contracts, rules and guarantees as additional institutional roles. The claim blurs the paper’s distinction between peer-to-peer and more integrated platforms: it does not establish that peer-to-peer transactions generally have their risks mitigated through legal governance mechanisms. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet

References 88 · Cited by 213

Research works printed but not linked: 60

  1. Albinsson, P.A., Yasanthi Perera, B., 2012. Alternative marketplaces in the 21st century: building community through sharing events. J. Cons. Behav. 11 (4), 303-315.
  2. Anderson, J.C., Narus, J.A., 1990. A model of distributor firm and manufacturing firm working partnerships. J. Market. 54 (1), 42-58.
  3. Aznar, J.P., Sayeras, J.M., Rocafort, A., Galiana, J., 2017. The irruption of Airbnb and its effects on hotel profitability: an analysis of Barcelona's hotel sector. Intang. Cap. 13 (1), 147-159.
  4. Baldwin, C.Y., Woodard, C.J., 2009. The architecture of platforms: a unified view. In: Gawer, A. (Ed.), Platforms, Markets and Innovation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 9-34.
  5. Bardhi, F., Eckhardt, G., 2012. Access-based consumption: the case of car-sharing. J. Consum. Res. 39 (4), 881-898.
  6. Benkler, Y., 2004. Sharing nicely. On shareable goods and the emergence of sharing as a modality of economic production. Yale Law J. 114 (2), 273-358.
  7. Biber, E., Light, S., Ruhl, J., Salzman, J., 2017. Regulating business innovation as policy disruption: from the Model T to Airbnb. Vanderbilt Law Rev. 70 (5), 1561-1626.
  8. Brochado, A., Troilo, M., Shah, A., 2017. Airbnb customer experience: evidence of con- vergence across three countries. Ann. Tour. Res. 63 (2017), 203-222.
  9. Chathoth, P., 2016. Historical evolution of hotel chains. In: Ivanova, M., Ivanov, S., Magnini, V.P. (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Hotel Chain Management. Routledge, London, pp. 27-40.
  10. Cheng, M., 2016. Sharing economy: a review and agenda for future research. Int. J. Hosp.
  11. Y.H. Akbar, A. Tracogna Manag. 57 (8), 60-70.
  12. Cohen, B., Muñoz, P., 2016. Mapping out the sharing economy: a configurational ap- proach to sharing business modelling. In: ESCP Paris, January. Paper Presented at the 2nd International Workshop on the Sharing Economy 2. pp. 8-29.
  13. Constantia, I., Eaton, B., Tuunainen, V.K., Sprague Jr., R.H., 2016. The evolution of a sharing platform into a sustainable business. In: Los Alamitos, CA : IEEE. In: Bui, T. (Ed.), Proceedings of the 49th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS 2016) 2016. pp. 1297-1306 (Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Proceedings, Vol. 2016).
  14. Edelman, B., Luca, M., Svirsky, D., 2017. Racial discrimination in the sharing economy: evidence from a field experiment. Am. Econ. J. 9 (2), 1-22.
  15. Eisenhardt, K.M., Graebner, M.E., 2007. Theory building from cases: opportunities and challenges. Acad. Manage. Rev. 50 (1), 25-32.
  16. Eisenmann, T.R., 2006. Internet companies' growth strategies: determinants of invest- ment intensity and long-term performance. Strateg. Manage. J. 27 (12), 1183-1204.
  17. Farrell, J., Katz, M.L., 2000. Innovation, rent extraction, and integration in systems markets. J. Ind. Econ. 48 (4), 413-432.
  18. Fombrun, C., Shanley, M., 1990. What's in a name? Reputation building and corporate strategy. Acad. Manag. J. 33 (2), 233-258.
  19. Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D., 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration. J. Pol. Econ. 94 (4), 691-719.
  20. Guttentag, D., Smith, S., 2017. Assessing Airbnb as a disruptive innovation relative to hotels: substitution and comparative performance expectations. Int. J. Hosp. Manag. 64 (7), 1-10.
  21. Guttentag, D., Smith, S., Potwarka, L., Havitz, M., 2017. Why tourists choose Airbnb: a motivation-based segmentation study. J. Travel Res. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ 0047287517696980. · DOI
  22. Habibi, M.R., Davidson, A., Laroche, M., 2017. What managers should know about the sharing economy. Bus. Horiz. 60 (1), 113-121.
  23. Hagiu, A., 2014. Strategic decisions for multisided platforms. MIT Sloan Manag. Rev. 55 (2), 71-80.
  24. Hamari, J., Sjöklint, M., Ukkonen, A., 2015. The sharing economy: why people participate in collaborative consumption. J. Assoc. Inform. Sci. Technol. 67 (9), 2047-2059.
  25. Hart, O., Moore, J., 1990. Property rights and the nature of the firm. J. Pol. Econ. 98 (6), 1119-1158.
  26. Henten, A., Windekilde, I., 2016. Transaction costs and the sharing economy digital policy. Regul. Govern. 18 (1), 1-15.
  27. Heyes, J., Tomlinson, M., Whitworth, A., 2017. Underemployment and well-being in the UK before and after the Great Recession Work. Empl. Soc. 31 (1), 71-89.
  28. Iansiti, M., Levien, R., 2004. The Keystone Advantage: What the New Dynamics of Business Ecosystems Mean for Strategy, Innovation, and Sustainability. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.
  29. Jeffrey, D., Hubbard, N.J., 1994. A model of hotel occupancy performance for monitoring and marketing in the hotel industry. Int. J. Hosp. Manag. 13 (1), 57-71.
  30. Jeffrey, D., Barden, R., Buckley, P., Hubbard, N.J., 2002. What makes for a successful hotel? Insights on hotel management following 15 years of hotel occupancy analysis in England. Serv. Ind. J. 22 (2), 73-88.
  31. Lalicic, L., Weismayer, C., 2017. The role of authenticity in Airbnb experiences. In: Schegg, R., Stangl, B. (Eds.), Information and Communication Technologies in Tourism. Springer International Publishing, London, pp. 781-794.
  32. Law, R., Leung, K., Wong, R.J., 2004. The impact of the Internet on travel agencies. Int. J. Contemp. Hosp. Manag. 16 (2), 100-107.
  33. Liang, L., Choi, C., Joppe, M., 2017. Understanding repurchase intention of Airbnb con- sumers: perceived authenticity, electronic word-of-mouth, and price sensitivity. J. Travel Tour. Market. 34 (1), 1-17.
  34. Macneil, I.R., 1978. Contracts: adjustment of long-term economic relations under clas- sical, neoclassical, and relational contract law. Northwest. Univ. Law Rev. 72 (6), 854-905.
  35. Meged, J., Christensen, M., 2016. Working within the collaborative tourist economy: the complex crafting of work and meaning. In: Dredge, D., Gyimóthy, S. (Eds.), Collaborative Economy: Perspectives Politics Policies and Prospects. Springer International, London, pp. 203-220.
  36. Meyer, B.D., Sullivan, J.X., 2013. Consumption and income inequality and the great re- cession. Am. Econ. Rev. 103 (3), 178-183.
  37. Morrell, P., 2005. Airlines within airlines: an analysis of US network airline responses to low cost carriers. J. Air Transp. Manag. 11 (5), 303-312.
  38. Oskam, J., Boswijk, A., 2016. Airbnb: the future of networked hospitality businesses. J. Tour. Futures 2 (1), 22-42.
  39. Ouchi, W.G., 1979. A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control mechanisms. Manage. Sci. 25 (9), 833-848.
  40. Parker, G.G., Van Alstyne, M.W., 2005. Two-sided network effects: a theory of informa- tion product design. Manage. Sci. 51 (10), 1494-1504.
  41. Piketty, T., 2015. Capital in Twenty-First Century. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
  42. Pullman, M., Rodgers, S., 2010. Capacity management for hospitality and tourism: a re- view of current approaches. Int. J. Hosp. Manag. 29 (1), 177-187.
  43. Richard, B., Cleveland, S., 2016. The future of hotel chains: branded marketplaces driven by the sharing economy. J. Vac. Market. 22 (3), 239-248.
  44. Richard, B., 2017. Hotel chains: survival strategies for a dynamic future. J. Tour. Futures 3 (1), 56-65.
  45. Rifkin, J., 2014. The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism. Palgrave. Macmillan, New York.
  46. Rochet, J., Tirole, J., 2006. Two-sided markets: a progress report. RAND J. Econ. 37 (2), 645-667.
  47. Schilling, M.A., 2009. Protecting or diffusing a technology platforms: tradeoffs in ap- propriability, network externalities, and architectural control. In: Gawer, A. (Ed.), Platforms, Markets and Innovation. Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK, pp. 192-218.
  48. Tadelis, S., Williamson, O.E., 2013. Transaction cost economics. In: Gibbons, R., Roberts, J. (Eds.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
  49. Tapscott, D., Williams, A.D., 2006. Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything. Penguin Group, New York.
  50. Tse, A.C., 2003. Disintermediation of travel agents in the hotel industry. Int. J. Hosp. Manag. 22 (4), 453-460.
  51. Varian, H., Shapiro, C., 1999. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. HBS Press, Boston, MA.
  52. Varmaa, A., Jukica, N., Pestek, A., Shultza, C., Nestorova, S., 2016. Airbnb: exciting in- novation or passing fad? Tour. Manag. Perspect. 20 (10), 228-237.
  53. Walter, G., 1985. Culture collisions in mergers and acquisitions. In: Frost, P., Moore, L.F., Louis, M.R., Lundberg, C., Martin, J. (Eds.), Organizational Culture. Sage, Beverly Hills CA, pp. 301-314.
  54. Wang, D., Nicolau, J., 2017. Price determinants of sharing economy based accommoda- tion rental: a study of listings from 33 cities on Airbnb.com. Int. J. Hosp. Manag. 62 (2017), 120-131.
  55. Weber, R., Camerer, C.F., 2003. Cultural conflict and merger failure: an experimental approach. Manag. Sci. 49 (4), 400-415.
  56. Williamson, O.E., 1971. The vertical integration of production: market failure con- siderations. Am. Econ. Rev. 61 (2), 112-123.
  57. Williamson, O.E., 1975. Markets and Hierarchies. Free Press, New York.
  58. Williamson, O.E., 1979. Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual re- lations. J. Law Econ. 22 (2), 233-261.
  59. Williamson, O.E., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press, New York.
  60. Zervas, G., Proserpio, D., Byers, J.W., 2017. The rise of the sharing economy: estimating the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry. J. Market. Res. 54 (5), 687-705.

Authors
Akbar, Y. H., & Tracogna, A.
Affiliations
  • Central European University (AT)
  • University of Trieste (IT)
Corresponding author
Akbar, Yusaf H.
ORCID
Venue
International Journal of Hospitality Management
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2018-04
Volume
71
Pages
91-101
ISSN
0278-4319 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.ijhm.2017.12.004
OpenAlex
W2781333598
Cited by
213
References
88
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 41 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 10
FWCI
37.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • International Journal of Hospitality Management (publishedVersion)
  • ArTS Archivio della ricerca di Trieste (University of Trieste https://www.units.it/) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Sharing Economy and Platforms
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Service and Product Innovation
Keywords
sharing economy, hotel industry, transaction cost economics, platform economics, sharing platforms, Airbnb, business model innovation, integration platform, asset specificity, transaction frequency, transaction uncertainty, hotel chains

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review