Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 99 of the 99 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 24 of the 122 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine peer-to-peer sharing platform business models, their sources of competitive advantage, and the roles, motivations and behaviors of key actors in their ecosystems. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses a conceptual approach that is rooted in the service, tourism and hospitality, and strategy literature. Findings First, this paper defines key types of platform business models in the sharing economy anddescribes their characteristics. In particular, the authors propose the differentiation between sharing platforms of capacity-constrained vs capacity-unconstrained assets and advance five core properties of the former. Second, the authors contrast platform business models with their pipeline business model counterparts to understand the fundamental differences between them. One important conclusion is that platforms cater to vastly more heterogeneous assets and consumer needs and, therefore, require liquidity and analytics for high-quality matching. Third, the authors examine the competitive position of platforms and conclude that their widely taken “winner takes it all” assumption is not valid. Primary network effects are less important once a critical level of liquidity has been reached and may even turn negative if increased listings raise friction in the form of search costs. Once a critical level of liquidity has been reached, a platform’s competitive position depends on stakeholder trust and service provider and user loyalty. Fourth, the authors integrate and synthesize the literature on key platform stakeholders of platform businesses (i.e. users, service providers, and regulators) and their roles and motivations. Finally, directions for further research are advanced. Practical implications This paper helps platform owners, service providers and users understand better the implications of sharing platform business models and how to position themselves in such ecosystems. Originality/value This paper integrates the extant literature on sharing platforms, takes a novel approach in delineating their key properties and dimensions, and provides insights into the evolving and dynamic forms of sharing platforms including converging business models.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This conceptual paper defines peer-to-peer sharing economy platforms as access-based, peer-to-peer platforms for capacity-constrained assets and contrasts them with pipeline businesses. It argues the “winner takes all” assumption is overstated because direct network effects weaken after critical liquidity, and competitive advantage then depends on trust, governance, and provider/user loyalty.
Key findings
- Proposes five core properties of peer-to-peer sharing platforms: no transfer of ownership; peer-to-peer exchange mediated by a digital platform; sharing of capacity-constrained tangible assets sometimes enhanced by labor; indirect network effects and liquidity improve matching quality; and direct network effects matter only up to a threshold (Table I).
- Contrasts platform and pipeline models: platforms are multi-sided, asset-light, have near-zero marginal costs, use dynamic pricing and analytics for heterogeneous supply/demand, and rely on ecosystem innovation; pipeline firms have high fixed costs, standardized offerings, and internalized innovation. Examples include Airbnb charging hosts a 3 percent service fee and guests 0–20 percent, and Uber’s surge pricing.
- Rejects the “winner takes all” view: once critical liquidity is reached, additional listings can add competition and search friction. Citing Li and Netessine, the paper reports that as hosts and travelers doubled, inquiries rose 18.3 percent to hosts and 19.6 percent to travelers; traveler confirmation rates dropped 15.4 percent, host occupancy dropped 15.9 percent, and the platform lost 5.6 percent of potential transactions.
- Synthesizes stakeholder roles across the consumer journey, provider motivations, and policy issues. Reported examples include that approximately two-thirds of Uber drivers use the platform as additional income and one-fifth use it as their only personal income source; Uber provides $1m in third-party liability coverage; and Airbnb’s Superhost program requires at least ten trips over a year.
Methods
- Conceptual approach rooted in the service, tourism and hospitality, and strategy literature; no primary empirical sample or new data collection.
- Synthesizes extant literature to define platform types, develop dimensions and core properties, contrast peer-to-peer sharing platforms with pipeline business models, and derive future research questions.
- Scope is for-profit, access-based, peer-to-peer platforms matching capacity-constrained assets and resources (e.g., Airbnb, Uber); it excludes marketer/platform-provided asset platforms (e.g., Zipcar, WeWork) and capacity-unconstrained sharing.
Limitations
- Stated limitations: Not stated in the paper.
- Evident: the paper is a conceptual synthesis without primary empirical testing, so its conclusions rely on cited studies and illustrative examples.
- Evident: the scope is deliberately limited to for-profit, access-based, peer-to-peer, capacity-constrained platforms; findings may not generalize to marketer-provided asset platforms, capacity-unconstrained platforms, or non-profit models.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
21 Valid · 17 Not valid · 57 Not checked · 78 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“This minimum viable platform size is determined by the nature of the network effects linking the platform's two or more-sided markets, the heterogeneity of assets and “tastes” of the actors (Akbar and Tracogna, 2018;Evans and Schmalensee, 2010), and equilibrium dynamics between service providers and users that allow stakeholder utilities to be maximized at a given price (Evans and Schmalensee, 201”
§ Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy > Network effects and liquidity
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Akbar and Tracogna, 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2.1, “The economics of platforms” (page unavailable), says platform owners need to reach a minimum viable size and describes same-side and cross-side network effects. The paper also discusses asset specificity, but the passages do not establish that heterogeneity of assets or actors’ “tastes” determines that minimum size. The equilibrium-and-utility clause is cited to Evans and Schmalensee, not to this paper. (LLM, conf=0.83)
- Not checked yetcites Evans and Schmalensee, 2010 source
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“platforms have demonstrated the ability to develop and use highly sophisticated algorithms and analytics that can mitigate the effects of capacity constraints caused by heterogeneity much more effectively than pipeline businesses”
§ Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy > JOSM 30,4
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Duch-Brown, 2017Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 4 says that greater user heterogeneity can create capacity constraints and that using data to personalise offers or advertising can overcome their effects. It also discusses the algorithms needed to operate platforms. But it does not establish that sophisticated algorithms and analytics do this much more effectively than those of pipeline businesses. (LLM, conf=0.85)
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Value co-creation among the platform, providers, consumers and complementors is fundamental to the platform's value creation process”
§ Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy > Market-level characteristics
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Andreassen et al., 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 4 identifies suppliers, buyers, and the platform organization as the three actors in the paper’s value-creation model; the Additional information section explicitly describes co-creation through their interaction. The claim’s inclusion of complementors as a fundamental participant is not supported by these passages. Page numbers are not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.87)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“instead of buying and owning things, consumers also increasingly prefer access and temporary use”
§ Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy > 466 JOSM 30,4
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Bardhi and Eckhardt, 2012 source
The ‘Emergence of Access-Based Consumption’ section describes a proliferation of access systems over the preceding decade. The paper also says consumers may choose access over ownership, while ‘Dimensionalizing the Field of Access’ explains that access generally involves more temporary use than ownership. Together, these support the broad paraphrase; the paper does not quantify how many consumers prefer access. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“risk and uncertainty are mitigated through instilling and managing trust via institutional and legal governance mechanisms”
§ Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy > Platform governance and trust
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Akbar and Tracogna, 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 4 (Propositions development; page unavailable) says platform owners reassure users facing uncertain transactions by adopting integration mechanisms. Section 3 describes reputation-building as a way to establish trust, and contracts, rules and guarantees as additional institutional roles. The claim blurs the paper’s distinction between peer-to-peer and more integrated platforms: it does not establish that peer-to-peer transactions generally have their risks mitigated through legal governance mechanisms. (LLM, conf=0.82)
- Supportedcites Perren and Kozinets, 2018 source
In “Patterns of Assurance in Trusted Platforms,” the paper says institutional arrangements help create the trust needed for lateral exchange and describes verification, insurance, guarantees, and warranties as ways to manage transaction trust. It also links these measures to uncertainty in matching buyers with service providers. (LLM, conf=0.93)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
85 more claims · 5 with their cited sources checked
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- It may state two separate claims as one. 59
- Probably not a substantial claim. 44
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy > 468 JOSM 30,4
“the more casual Airbnb hosts who deliver authentic experiences”
§ Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy > 468 JOSM 30,4
“While in the latter case social and authentic experiences may be diminished, accessibility and convenience are increased.”
Citations
Cites
Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition
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The Effect of Word of Mouth on Sales: Online Book Reviews
Chevalier, J. A., & Mayzlin, D. (2006) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmkr.43.3.345 · Cited by 6,003 · cited 1×
“For example, convolutional neural networks can detect features in texts and images to encode meaning and emotional expressions (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; He et al., 2016).”
BackgroundDeep Residual Learning for Image Recognition
He, K., Zhang, X., Ren, S., & Sun, J. (2015) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1512.03385 · Cited by 4,196
The sharing economy: Why people participate in collaborative consumption
Hamari, J., Sjöklint, M., & Ukkonen, A. (2016) · Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology · doi:10.1002/asi.23552 · Cited by 3,439 · cited 7×
“We therefore consider sharing economy platforms as only those that provide access to assets, resources and services without the transfer of ownership, which is consistent with much of the sharing economy literature (e.g. Benoit et al., 2017; Hamari et al., 2016; Kumar et al., 2018; Schaefers et al., 2016; Zervas et al…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialIndustry Platforms and Ecosystem Innovation
Gawer, A., & Cusumano, M. A. (2014) · Journal of Product Innovation Management · doi:10.1111/jpim.12105 · Cited by 2,394
The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry
Zervas, G., Proserpio, D., & Byers, J. W. (2017) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmr.15.0204 · Cited by 2,376 · cited 10×
“Cost structure represents an important differentiator between platform and pipeline business models whereby a platform’s fixed and marginal costs are typically lower compared to their pipeline business model counterparts (Zervas et al., 2017).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialBrave new world: service robots in the frontline
Wirtz, J., Patterson, P. G., Kunz, W. H., Gruber, T., Lu, V. N., Paluch, S., & Martins, A. (2018) · Journal of Service Management · doi:10.1108/josm-04-2018-0119 · Cited by 2,315
Self-citationReducing buyer search costs: Implications for electronic marketplaces
Bakos, J. Y. (1997) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.43.12.1676 · Cited by 2,259
Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car Sharing: Table 1.
Bardhi, F., & Eckhardt, G. M. (2012) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/666376 · Cited by 2,015
Extended Self in a Digital World: Table 1.
Belk, R. W. (2013) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/671052 · Cited by 1,698
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- Dellarocas, C. (2000), “The design of reliable trust management systems for electronic trade communities”, working paper, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
- 2015, The sharing economy isn’t about sharing at all, Harvard Business Review, 93, 881
- 2017, Cyber trust, Journal of Business Ethics, 122, 1
- 2016, The Matchmakers: The new Economics of Multisided Platforms
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- 2016, Network effects aren’t enough, Harvard Business Review, 94, 64
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Cited by
Corporate digital responsibility
Lobschat, L., Mueller, B., Eggers, F., Brandimarte, L., Diefenbach, S., Kroschke, M., & Wirtz, J. (2021) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.10.006 · Cited by 573
“• Service literature addresses the effects of service robots and privacy issues related to facial recognition, constant monitoring of consumers, decision making by AI (Van Doorn et al., 2017; Wirtz et al., 2018), and the vast amount of personal and transaction data captured by platform businesses such as Airbnb and Ub…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationLu, V. N., Wirtz, J., Kunz, W. H., Paluch, S., Gruber, T., Martins, A., & Patterson, P. G. (2020) · Journal of Service Theory and Practice · doi:10.1108/jstp-04-2019-0088 · Cited by 596
Self-citationArtificial intelligence in marketing: Topic modeling, scientometric analysis, and research agenda
Mustak, M., Salminen, J., Plé, L., & Wirtz, J. (2021) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.10.044 · Cited by 555
Self-citationDe Keyser, A., Verleye, K., Lemon, K. N., Keiningham, T. L., & Klaus, P. (2020) · Journal of Service Research · doi:10.1177/1094670520928390 · Cited by 457
Hermes, S., Riasanow, T., Clemons, E. K., Böhm, M., & Krcmar, H. (2020) · Business Research · doi:10.1007/s40685-020-00125-x · Cited by 330
Metadata
- Authors
- Wirtz, J., So, K. K. F., Mody, M. A., Liu, S. Q., & Chun, H. H.
- Affiliations
- National University of Singapore (SG)
- University of South Carolina (US)
- Boston University (US)
- The Ohio State University (US)
- Cornell University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Wirtz, Jochen
- Venue
- Journal of Service Management
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2019-10-16
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 452-483
- ISSN
- 1757-5818 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2973057865
- Cited by
- 414
- References
- 92
- Citations by year
- 2026: 34 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 70 · 2023: 70 · 2022: 75 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 50 · 2019: 11
- FWCI
- 64.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- www.emerald.com/insight/site-policies (tdm)
- Locations
- Journal of service management (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- National University of Singapore (submittedVersion)
- OpenBU (Boston University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Ministry of Education - Singapore (MOE2016-SSRTG-059)
- Ministry of Education, India
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Sharing Economy and Platforms
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Digital Economy and Work Transformation
- Keywords
- sharing platforms, platform business models, network effects, liquidity, matching quality, competitive advantage, stakeholder trust, user loyalty, platform regulation, platform ecosystems
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1108/josm-11-2018-0369
- The paper
- Wirtz, J., So, K. K. F., Mody, M. A., Liu, S. Q., & Chun, H. H. (2019). Platforms in the peer-to-peer sharing economy. Journal of Service Management. https://doi.org/10.1108/josm-11-2018-0369
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