The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335
Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure
Klein, A. (1998) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467391 · Cited by 1,761
Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition
(1985) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036883 · Cited by 1,736
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
FICH, E. M., & SHIVDASANI, A. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00852.x · Cited by 1,660
Mace, M. L. (1971) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,481
Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments
Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00559 · Cited by 1,479
Cited by
The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance
Carter, D. A., D'Souza, F., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2010) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00809.x · Cited by 1,842
Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters?
Bennouri, M., Chtioui, T., Nagati, H., & Nekhili, M. (2018) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.12.010 · Cited by 553
Board characteristics and Chinese bank performance
Liang, Q., Xu, P., & Jiraporn, P. (2013) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.018 · Cited by 458
Self-citationMultiple directorships and acquirer returns
Ahn, S., Jiraporn, P., & Kim, Y. S. (2010) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.01.009 · Cited by 264
Self-citationHow does boardroom diversity influence the relationship between ESG and firm financial performance?
Wu, Z., Gao, J., Luo, C., Xu, H., & Shi, G. (2024) · International Review of Economics & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.iref.2023.10.045 · Cited by 115
Metadata
- Authors
- Jiraporn, P., Singh, M., & Lee, C. I.
- Venue
- Journal of Banking & Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-05
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 819-828
- ISSN
- 0378-4266 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2026946218
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 19.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.09.020
- The paper
- Jiraporn, P., Singh, M., & Lee, C. I. (2009). Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships. Journal of Banking & Finance. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.09.020
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.