The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
Abstract
Firms with busy boards, those in which a majority of outside directors hold three or more directorships, are associated with weak corporate governance. These firms exhibit lower market‐to‐book ratios, weaker profitability, and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Independent but busy boards display CEO turnover‐performance sensitivities indistinguishable from those of inside‐dominated boards. Departures of busy outside directors generate positive abnormal returns (ARs). When directors become busy as a result of acquiring an additional directorship, other companies in which they hold board seats experience negative ARs. Busy outside directors are more likely to depart boards following poor performance.
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Citations
Cites
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Cited by
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358
Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: A cross-country analysis
Dahya, J., Dimitrov, O., & McConnell, J. J. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.005 · Cited by 659
Field, L., Lowry, M., & Mkrtchyan, A. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.004 · Cited by 561
CAI, J., GARNER, J. L., & WALKLING, R. A. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01504.x · Cited by 470
Corporate Board Governance and Voluntary Disclosure of Executive Compensation Practices*
Laksmana, I. (2008) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1506/car.25.4.8 · Cited by 409
Metadata
- Authors
- FICH, E. M., & SHIVDASANI, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-03-09
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 689-724
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W4252449759
- Cited by
- 1,660
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 115.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
