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Cited by 373

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Judging near and distant virtue and vice

Open access
Eyal, Tal, Liberman, Nira, Trope, Yaacov·2008·Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

Abstract

We propose that people judge immoral acts as more offensive and moral acts as more virtuous when the acts are psychologically distant than near. This is because people construe more distant situations in terms of moral principles, rather than attenuating situation-specific considerations. Results of four studies support these predictions. Study 1 shows that more temporally distant transgressions (e.g., eating one's dead dog) are construed in terms of moral principles rather than contextual information. Studies 2 and 3 further show that morally offensive actions are judged more severely when imagined from a more distant temporal (Study 2) or social (Study 3) perspective. Finally, Study 4 shows that moral acts (e.g., adopting a disabled child) are judged more positively from temporal distance. The findings suggest that people more readily apply their moral principles to distant rather than proximal behaviors.

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Metadata

Authors
Eyal, T., Liberman, N., & Trope, Y.
Venue
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2008-07
Volume
44
Issue
4
Pages
1204-1209
ISSN
0022-1031 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2099104144
Cited by
373
References
31
FWCI
5.19
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Judging near and distant virtue and vice. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.03.012
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Eyal, T., Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2008). Judging near and distant virtue and vice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.03.012

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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