The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pairwise kidney exchange
Open accessAbstract
The literature on exchange of indivisible goods finds natural application in the exchange of live donor kidneys for transplant. However, in kidney exchange, there are constraints on the size of exchanges. Initially, kidney exchanges are likely to be between just two patient–donor pairs. We show that, although this constraint eliminates some potential exchanges, there is a wide class of constrained-efficient mechanisms that are strategy-proof when patient–donor pairs and surgeons have 0–1 preferences. This includes deterministic mechanisms that accommodate the priority setting that organ banks currently use to allocate cadaver organs, and stochastic mechanisms that allow distributive justice issues to be addressed.
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Cites
Edmonds, J. (1965) · Canadian Journal of Mathematics · doi:10.4153/cjm-1965-045-4 · Cited by 2,428
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2312726 · Cited by 2,082
Hall, P. (1935) · Journal of the London Mathematical Society · doi:10.1112/jlms/s1-10.37.26 · Cited by 1,954
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157061 · Cited by 1,568
Self-citationThe evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory
Roth, A. E. (1984) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261272 · Cited by 1,219
Self-citationShapley, L. S., & Scarf, H. E. (1974) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0 · Cited by 1,158
Roth, A. E. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00335 · Cited by 1,004
Self-citationThe Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Roth, A. E. (1982) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.7.4.617 · Cited by 895
Self-citationMatroids and the greedy algorithm
Edmonds, J. (1971) · Mathematical Programming · doi:10.1007/bf01584082 · Cited by 866
Roth, A. E., & Peranson, E. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748 · Cited by 756
Self-citation
Cited by
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157061 · Cited by 1,568
Self-citationWhy Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets
Satz, D. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311594.001.0001 · Cited by 735
Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets
Roth, A. E. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.3.37 · Cited by 560
Self-citationAlgorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
Manlove, D. F. (2013) · Series on Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1142/8591 · Cited by 515
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.5.1954 · Cited by 500
Self-citationEfficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Ünver, M. U. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.3.828 · Cited by 392
Self-citationOnline Matching and Ad Allocation
Mehta, A. (2010) · Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1561/0400000057 · Cited by 387
What Have We Learned from Market Design?
Roth, A. E. (2008) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02121.x · Cited by 383
Self-citationA Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain
Rees, M. A., Kopke, J. E., Pelletier, R. P., Segev, D. L., Rutter, M. E., Fabrega, A. J., Rogers, J., Pankewycz, O. G., Hiller, J., Roth, A. E., et al. (2009) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejmoa0803645 · Cited by 324
Self-citationDesigning Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications
Budish, E., Che, Y.-K., Kojima, F., & Milgrom, P. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.2.585 · Cited by 303
Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two- and Three-Way Exchanges
Saidman, S. L., Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., Ünver, M. U., & Delmonico, F. L. (2006) · Transplantation · doi:10.1097/01.tp.0000195775.77081.25 · Cited by 263
Self-citationIncentive Design in Peer Review: Rating and Repeated Endogenous Matching
Xiao, Y., Dorfler, F., & Schaar, M. V. D. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering · doi:10.1109/tnse.2018.2877578 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Utku Ünver, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 125
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 151-188
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2234443685
- Cited by
- 536
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 32.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.