The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pairwise kidney exchange
Open accessAbstract
The literature on exchange of indivisible goods finds natural application in the exchange of live donor kidneys for transplant. However, in kidney exchange, there are constraints on the size of exchanges. Initially, kidney exchanges are likely to be between just two patient–donor pairs. We show that, although this constraint eliminates some potential exchanges, there is a wide class of constrained-efficient mechanisms that are strategy-proof when patient–donor pairs and surgeons have 0–1 preferences. This includes deterministic mechanisms that accommodate the priority setting that organ banks currently use to allocate cadaver organs, and stochastic mechanisms that allow distributive justice issues to be addressed.
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Cites
Edmonds, J. (1965) · Canadian Journal of Mathematics · doi:10.4153/cjm-1965-045-4 · Cited by 2,428
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2312726 · Cited by 2,082
Hall, P. (1935) · Journal of the London Mathematical Society · doi:10.1112/jlms/s1-10.37.26 · Cited by 1,954
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157061 · Cited by 1,568
Self-citationThe evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory
Roth, A. E. (1984) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261272 · Cited by 1,219
Self-citationShapley, L. S., & Scarf, H. E. (1974) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0 · Cited by 1,158
Roth, A. E. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00335 · Cited by 1,004
Self-citationThe Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Roth, A. E. (1982) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.7.4.617 · Cited by 895
Self-citationMatroids and the greedy algorithm
Edmonds, J. (1971) · Mathematical Programming · doi:10.1007/bf01584082 · Cited by 866
Roth, A. E., & Peranson, E. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748 · Cited by 756
Self-citationA New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem
Bogomolnaia, A., & Moulin, H. (2001) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2710 · Cited by 726
The New York City High School Match
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774670167 · Cited by 654
Self-citationRandom Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (1998) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2998580 · Cited by 611
Self-citationWilson, R. B. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00334 · Cited by 580
The Boston Public School Match
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., & Sönmez, T. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774669637 · Cited by 530
Self-citationThe college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
Roth, A. E. (1985) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1 · Cited by 466
Self-citationHouse Allocation with Existing Tenants
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (1999) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2553 · Cited by 448
Self-citationKidney Paired Donation and Optimizing the Use of Live Donor Organs
Segev, D. L. (2005) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/jama.293.15.1883 · Cited by 442
Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Roth, A. E., & Postlewaite, A. (1977) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(77)90004-0 · Cited by 378
Self-citationRandom Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
Roth, A. E., & Vate, J. H. V. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938326 · Cited by 353
Self-citationIncentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
Roth, A. E. (1982) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(82)90003-9 · Cited by 279
Self-citationA Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England
Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Ünver, M. U. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774669989 · Cited by 279
Self-citationRandom Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
(2003) · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00483.x · Cited by 229
Roth, A. E., & Xing, X. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262074 · Cited by 204
Self-citationStable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. G., & Vande Vate, J. H. (1993) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.18.4.803 · Cited by 182
Self-citationOn the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings
Chung, K.-S. (2000) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1999.0779 · Cited by 163
Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
Ehlers, L., & Klaus, B. (2003) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0259-1 · Cited by 111
Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
Diamantoudi, E., Miyagawa, E., & Xue, L. (2003) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.05.003 · Cited by 111
The gastroenterology fellowship Match: How it failed and why it could succeed once again
Niederle, M., & Roth, A. E. (2004) · Gastroenterology · doi:10.1053/j.gastro.2004.05.034 · Cited by 77
Self-citationOrdinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00091-7 · Cited by 72
Self-citationThe Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match?
Niederle, M., & Roth, A. E. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774669691 · Cited by 51
Self-citationStable matchings and linear inequalities
Abeledo, H. G., & Rothblum, U. G. (1994) · Discrete Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1016/0166-218x(94)90130-9 · Cited by 37
Cited by
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157061 · Cited by 1,568
Self-citationWhy Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets
Satz, D. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311594.001.0001 · Cited by 735
Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets
Roth, A. E. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.3.37 · Cited by 560
Self-citationAlgorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
Manlove, D. F. (2013) · Series on Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1142/8591 · Cited by 515
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.5.1954 · Cited by 500
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Utku Ünver, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 125
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 151-188
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2234443685
- Cited by
- 536
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 32.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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