Strategic information transmission networks
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Cites
Strategic information transmission
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“2 Our specific results are derived in a simple quadratic-loss Beta-binomial model, but they deliver insights based on general properties of Bayesian models and of utility functions in the Crawford and Sobel [9] framework.”
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BackgroundCredulity, lies, and costly talk ∗
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Krishna, V. (2001) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055401002192 · Cited by 194 · cited 4×
“This literature is too vast to be fully surveyed here, and we discuss only the papers closer to ours.5 The first one is the study of many-to-one communication by Morgan and Stocken [26].6 One of their findings is that each sender’s incentives to reveal information declines with the number of senders communicating with…”
BackgroundInfluentialInterested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule
Austen-Smith, D. (1993) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1993.1002 · Cited by 173
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Strategic Communication Networks
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Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State SpacesPreprint
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Eliciting information from multiple experts
Wolinsky, A. (2002) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00003-9 · Cited by 118 · cited 4×
“We thank Daron Acemoglu, Attila Ambrus, David Austen-Smith, Drew Fudenberg, Johannes Horner, Frederic Koessler, Alessandro Pavan, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Andrea Prat, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Joel Sobel, Peter Sorensen, Adam Szeidl, Joel Watson, Asher Wolinsky, Leaat Yariv, and participants at theory seminar…”
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Self-citationPolicy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts
Battaglini, M. (2004) · The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics · doi:10.2202/1534-5963.1100 · Cited by 113 · cited 2×
“The state of the world θ is uniformly dis- 5 Other influential works include Ambrus and Takahashi [1], Austen-Smith [2], Battaglini [4,5], Gilligan and Krehbiel [15,16], Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani [21], Krishna and Morgan [23,24], Wolinsky [27].”
BackgroundInformation Aggregation in Polls
Morgan, J. M., & Stocken, P. C. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.3.864 · Cited by 105 · cited 3×
“5 The first one is the study of many-to-one communication by Morgan and Stocken [26].”
BackgroundHow to talk to multiple audiences
Goltsman, M., & Pavlov, G. (2010) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.007 · Cited by 98 · cited 3×
“The strategy profile (m,y) is an equilibrium if and only if for every truthful message from a player i to an audience J ∈ Ni , 2 ∣∣∣∣bi − ∑ j∈J bjγj ( c(m,y) )∣∣∣∣ ∑ j∈J 1 (kj (c(m,y)) + 3)γj ( c(m,y) ) , (2) 10 However, unlike Goltsman and Pavlov [17], our model of communication does not allow players to send both a…”
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Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
McGee, A. D., & Yang, H. (2013) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.001 · Cited by 36 · cited 1×
“For example, see McGee and Yang [25], who consider a multidimensional state and different signals that convey complementary information across different dimensions.”
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Rogers, B. W. (2006) · Cited by 26
Endogenous Communication in Complex Organizations
Calvó‐Armengol, A., de Martí, J., & Prat, A. (2009) · London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) · Cited by 17
Communication networks in markets
Gallo, E. (2020) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103545 · Cited by 16
Multidimensional Communication Mechanisms: Cooperative and Conflicting Designs ∗Preprint
Koessler, F., & Martimort, D. (2008) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 8
Cited by
Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks
Acemoglu, D., & Ozdaglar, A. (2011) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-010-0004-1 · Cited by 705
“Most closely related to the model we will present here are [41, 55], which look at one-shot cheap talk games super-imposed over a network of interacting agents.”
BackgroundSpread of (mis)information in social networks
Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A., & ParandehGheibi, A. (2010) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.005 · Cited by 444
Jackson, M. O., & Zenou, Y. (2015) · Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53766-9.00003-3 · Cited by 313
Metadata
- Authors
- Galeotti, A., Ghiglino, C., & Squintani, F.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-09
- Volume
- 148
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1751-1769
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2136459968
- Cited by
- 180
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 25.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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