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Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments
Open accessAbstract
We reexamine the major tenets of the informational theory of legislative rules, focusing on the informational efficiency of rules with varying degrees of restrictiveness. When committees are heterogeneous, full efficiency is attainable under the unrestrictive open rule as well as the somewhat restrictive modified rule. In contrast, the restrictive closed rule always leads to inefficiencies. When committees are homogeneous, the situation is different. All equilibria are inefficient regardless of legislative rules, but the closed rule leads to greater informational efficiency than does the open rule. Furthermore, the efficiency gains under the closed rule more than offset distributional losses regardless of the degree of preference divergence. We also examine the incentives provided by the different rules for information acquisition and committee specialization.
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Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036932 · Cited by 638
Cited by
Authority and Communication in Organizations
Dessein, W. (2002) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00227 · Cited by 964
Brunia, C. H. M., & van Boxtel, G. J. M. (2001) · International Journal of Psychophysiology · doi:10.1016/s0167-8760(01)00179-9 · Cited by 721
Krishna, V., & Morgan, J. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530151144159 · Cited by 531
Self-citationMultiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
Battaglini, M. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00336 · Cited by 484
Bendor, J., Glazer, A., & Hammond, T. (2001) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.235 · Cited by 450
Metadata
- Authors
- Krishna, V.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2001-06
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 435-452
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2151262666
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 18.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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