Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in asymmetric games
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We model evolution according to an asymmetric game as occurring in multiple finite populations, one for each role in the game, and study the effect of subjecting individuals to stochastic strategy mutations. We show that, when these mutations occur sufficiently infrequently, the dynamics over all population states simplify to an ergodic Markov chain over just the pure population states (where each population is monomorphic). This makes calculation of the stationary distribution computationally feasible. The transition probabilities of this embedded Markov chain involve fixation probabilities of mutants in single populations. The asymmetry of the underlying game leads to fixation probabilities that are derived from frequency-independent selection, in contrast to the analogous single-population symmetric-game case (Fudenberg and Imhof, 2006). This frequency independence is useful in that it allows us to employ results from the population genetics literature to calculate the stationary distribution of the evolutionary process, giving sharper, and sometimes even analytic, results. We demonstrate the utility of this approach by applying it to a battle-of-the-sexes game, a Crawford–Sobel signalling game, and the beer-quiche game of Cho and Kreps (1987).
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Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
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“of multiple ‘roles’ (‘Player 1’, ‘Player 2’, etc.). In the evolutionary approach, the simplest way to incorporate multiple roles is to model evolution as occurring in multiple interacting populations [3, 5, 12, 25{29].1 Suppose that we have an underlying game with roles i= 1;:::;I, each role associated 1In Section 5,…”
BackgroundAnalysis of Genetic Inheritance in a Family Quartet by Whole-Genome Sequencing
Roach, J. C., Glusman, G., Smit, A. F. A., Huff, C. D., Hubley, R., Shannon, P. T., Rowen, L., Pant, K. P., Goodman, N., Bamshad, M., et al. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1186802 · Cited by 1,084
Evolutionary dynamics in set structured populations
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The Red King effect: When the slowest runner wins the coevolutionary race
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Cited by
The evolution of trust and trustworthiness
Kumar, A., Capraro, V., & Perc, M. (2020) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2020.0491 · Cited by 148
Evaluating the structure-coefficient theorem of evolutionary game theory
McAvoy, A., & Wakeley, J. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2119656119 · Cited by 23
Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of trust games with asymmetric parameters
Lim, I. S. (2020) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.102.062419 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Veller, C., & Hayward, L. K.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016-03
- Volume
- 162
- Pages
- 93-113
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W220156613
- Cited by
- 34
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 8.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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