The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Directors' and officers' liability insurance and acquisition outcomes
Open accessAbstract
We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the outcomes of merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We find that acquirers whose executives have a higher level of D&O insurance coverage experience significantly lower announcement-period abnormal stock returns. Further analyses suggest that acquirers with a higher level of D&O insurance protection tend to pay higher acquisition premiums and their acquisitions appear to exhibit lower synergies. The evidence provides support for the notion that the provision of D&O insurance can induce unintended moral hazard by shielding directors and officers from the discipline of shareholder litigation.
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Cites
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
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The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
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Firm size and the gains from acquisitions
Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P., & Stulz, R. M. (2004) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.07.002 · Cited by 2,322
Stock market driven acquisitions
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The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world
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Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
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Cited by
Do analysts matter for governance? Evidence from natural experiments
Chen, T., Harford, J., & Lin, C. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.10.002 · Cited by 747
Self-citationFailure and success in mergers and acquisitions
Renneboog, L., & Vansteenkiste, C. (2019) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.07.010 · Cited by 344
CEO duality and firm performance: Evidence from an exogenous shock to the competitive environment
Yang, T., & Zhao, S. (2014) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.008 · Cited by 312
Metadata
- Authors
- Lin, C., Officer, M. S., & Zou, H.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-12
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 507-525
- ISSN
- 0304-405X
- OpenAlex
- W3124775577
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 35.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.