The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Liquid-claim production, risk management, and bank capital structure: Why high leverage is optimal for banks
Open accessAbstract
Liquidity production is a central role of banks. When there is a market premium for the production of (socially valuable) liquid financial claims and no other departures from the Modigliani and Miller (1958, MM) assumptions, we show that high leverage is optimal for banks. In this model, high leverage is not the result of distortions from agency problems, deposit insurance, or tax motives to borrow. The model can explain (i) why bank leverage increased over the last 150 years or so without invoking any of these distortions, and (ii) why high bank leverage per se does not necessarily cause systemic risk. MM?s leverage irrelevance theorem is inapplicable to banks: Because debt-equity neutrality assigns zero weight to the social value of liquidity, it is an inappropriately equity-biased criterion for assessing whether the high leverage ratios of real-world banks are excessive or socially destructive.
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Cites
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Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares
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Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk
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Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector
Holmstrom, B., & Tirole, J. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555316 · Cited by 3,889
Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt
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Nguyen, J. H., & Phan, H. V. (2020) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101713 · Cited by 415
Bank Capital and Lending Relationships
SCHWERT, M. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12604 · Cited by 392
Banks as patient fixed-income investors
Hanson, S. G., Shleifer, A., Stein, J. C., & Vishny, R. W. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.06.015 · Cited by 319
Finance, distribution and the economic objective of financial cooperative institutions
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Metadata
- Authors
- DeAngelo, H., & Stulz, R. M.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2015-05
- Volume
- 116
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 219-236
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121893308
- Cited by
- 290
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 39.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- DeAngelo, H., & Stulz, R. M. (2015). Liquid-claim production, risk management, and bank capital structure: Why high leverage is optimal for banks. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.11.011
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.