The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Citations
Cites
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?
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Natural resources, education, and economic development
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CLIENTELISM, INTERESTS, AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION
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Cited by
Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?
Ploeg, F. V. D. (2011) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.49.2.366 · Cited by 2,283
Political foundations of the resource curse
Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., & Verdier, T. (2006) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.01.008 · Cited by 1,706
Self-citationIs Democracy Good for the Poor?
Ross, M. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00220.x · Cited by 780
Using Natural Resources for Development: Why Has It Proven So Difficult?
Venables, A. J. (2016) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.30.1.161 · Cited by 634
Baland, J.-M., Moene, K. O., & Robinson, J. A. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00007-0 · Cited by 593
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Robinson, J. A., & Torvik, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-02
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 197-210
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4248619017
- Cited by
- 301
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 15.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.