The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
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Citations
Cites
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2312726 · Cited by 2,082
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157061 · Cited by 1,568
Self-citationJob Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
Kelso, A. S., & Crawford, V. P. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913392 · Cited by 1,307
The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory
Roth, A. E. (1984) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261272 · Cited by 1,219
Roth, A. E. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00335 · Cited by 1,004
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Roth, A. E. (1982) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.7.4.617 · Cited by 895
Roth, A. E., & Peranson, E. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748 · Cited by 756
Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
Dubins, L. E., & Freedman, D. A. (1981) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1981.11995301 · Cited by 654
The New York City High School Match
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774670167 · Cited by 654
A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement
Balinski, M., & Sönmez, T. (1999) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1998.2469 · Cited by 565
Self-citationThe Boston Public School Match
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., & Sönmez, T. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774669637 · Cited by 530
Self-citationThe college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
Roth, A. E. (1985) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1 · Cited by 466
School choice: an experimental study
Chen, Y., & Sönmez, T. (2006) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.006 · Cited by 376
Self-citationA crash course in implementation theory
Jackson, M. O. (2001) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s003550100152 · Cited by 372
Roth, A. E. (1991) · PubMed · Cited by 343
Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
Ergin, H. I. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00383 · Cited by 275
Self-citationMs. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
Gale, D., & Sotomayor, M. (1985) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1985.11971592 · Cited by 202
Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications
Teo, C.-P., Sethuraman, J., & Tan, W.-P. (2001) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.47.9.1252.9784 · Cited by 183
Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism
Mongell, S. J., & Roth, A. E. (1991) · American Economic Review · Cited by 139
Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
Roth, A. E. (1984) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(84)90152-2 · Cited by 129
Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems
Alcalde, J. (1996) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.0050 · Cited by 110
Nash Implementation of Matching Rules
Kara, T., & Sönmez, T. (1996) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.0024 · Cited by 76
Self-citationImplementation of college admission rules
Kara, T., & Sönmez, T. (1997) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01213799 · Cited by 60
Self-citationSimple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems
Alcalde, J., & Romero‐Medina, A. (2000) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1999.0743 · Cited by 59
Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets
Konishi, H., & Ünver, M. U. (2006) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0097-z · Cited by 58
Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems
Sönmez, T. (1997) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0559 · Cited by 42
Self-citationEhlers, L., & Klaus, B. (2005) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.009 · Cited by 42
A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
Shin, S., & Suh, S.-C. (1996) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1 · Cited by 35
Cited by
The Boston Public School Match
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., & Sönmez, T. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774669637 · Cited by 530
Self-citationDeferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
Roth, A. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13225 · Cited by 392
What Have We Learned from Market Design?
Roth, A. E. (2008) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02121.x · Cited by 383
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
Roth, A. E. (2008) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-008-0117-6 · Cited by 372
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
Kojima, F., & Pathak, P. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.608 · Cited by 362
Metadata
- Authors
- Ergin, H., & Sönmez, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-01
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 215-237
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2014325187
- Cited by
- 305
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 20.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.