Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect
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Cites
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Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice
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The all-pay auction with complete information
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Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions
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Presidential primaries and the dynamics of public choice
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Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra
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Marathon: The Pursuit of the Presidency 1972-1976
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ON THE ROLE OF THE PRIMARY SYSTEM IN CANDIDATE SELECTION
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Cited by
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
Sheremeta, R. M. (2010) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.001 · Cited by 297
Konrad, K. A., & Kovenock, D. (2009) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.05.002 · Cited by 264
Metadata
- Authors
- Klumpp, T., & Polborn, M. K.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-08
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 6-7
- Pages
- 1073-1114
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123197712
- Cited by
- 278
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 14.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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