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Cited by 255

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Decentralization and the productive efficiency of government: Evidence from Swiss cantons

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Barankay, Iwan, Lockwood, Ben · 2007 · Journal of Public Economics

Abstract

Advocates of fiscal decentralization argue that amongst other benefits, it can increase the efficiency of delivery of government services. This paper is one of the first to evaluate this claim empirically by looking at the association between education expenditure decentralization and the productive efficiency of schools using a data-set of Swiss cantons. We first provide careful evidence that expenditure decentralization is a powerful proxy for legal local autonomy. Further panel regressions of Swiss cantons provide robust evidence that more decentralization is associated with higher educational attainment. We also show that these gains lead to no adverse effects across education types but that male students benefited more from educational decentralization closing, for the Swiss case, the gender education gap.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.006

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Metadata

Authors
Barankay, I., & Lockwood, B.
Venue
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2007-06
Volume
91
Issue
5-6
Pages
1197-1218
ISSN
0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3121653103
Cited by
255
References
16
FWCI
81.47
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Decentralization and the productive efficiency of government: Evidence from Swiss cantons. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.006
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Barankay, I., & Lockwood, B. (2007). Decentralization and the productive efficiency of government: Evidence from Swiss cantons. Journal of Public Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.006

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.