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Cited by 257Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesAuction Theory and ApplicationsGame Theory and Voting Systems

Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study

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Cason, Timothy N., Masters, William A., Sheremeta, Roman M.·2010·Journal of Public Economics
DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.006
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  • Contests and tournaments with rank-dependent financial rewards elicit more individual effort than piece-rate remuneration schemes.

    “Specifically, contests and tournaments, where financial rewards depend on rank performance, elicit more individual effort than piece-wise remuneration schemes and, in fact, drive individual effort expenditure beyond what is rational (Cason, Masters, & Sheremeta, 2010;Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014;Dechenaux, Kovenock, & Sheremeta, 2015;Dickinson & Isaac, 1998).”

    From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests (2022) · cites this paper as Cason, Masters, & Sheremeta, 2010

    The Introduction and §2.1 describe rank-dependent contests and a piece-rate option. But §3.1 and the Conclusions compare achievement chiefly between proportional-prize and winner-take-all contests; they do not establish that contests elicit more individual effort than piece-rate pay. Section 3.3 reports excessive contest entry relative to expected payoffs, not effort expenditure beyond a rational level. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Empirical research on contests and tournaments contradicts Festinger's expectation that underachievers increase effort.

    “However, empirical research on contests and tournaments contradicts Festinger's expectation that underachievers increase effort.”

    From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests (2022) · cites this paper as Cason et al., 2010

    The Results (section 3.2; page unavailable) show that lower-ability subjects were less likely to enter winner-take-all contests when facing strong opponents. The same section reports that individual performance did not depend on competitors’ abilities. These findings do not show underachievers increasing effort, but the paper tests contest entry and performance, not Festinger’s specific expectation about underachievers’ effort. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Contests and tournaments drive individual effort expenditure beyond what is rational.

    “Specifically, contests and tournaments, where financial rewards depend on rank performance, elicit more individual effort than piece-wise remuneration schemes and, in fact, drive individual effort expenditure beyond what is rational (Cason, Masters, & Sheremeta, 2010;Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014;Dechenaux, Kovenock, & Sheremeta, 2015;Dickinson & Isaac, 1998).”

    From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests (2022) · cites this paper as Cason, Masters, & Sheremeta, 2010

    The Introduction (p. unavailable) says the contests elicit effort, and Results §3.1 reports greater total achievement in proportional-prize than winner-take-all contests. But §3.1 says overall achievement is nearly identical when piece-rate effort is included, and §3.3 documents excessive contest entry, not individual effort expenditure beyond a rational level. The source therefore does not support the claimed excess individual effort or a general effort advantage over piece-rate pay. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Compared to piece-rate schemes, contests, all-pay auctions, and tournaments result in higher variance in individual effort.

    “Compared to piece-rate schemes, contests, all-pay auctions, and tournaments result in higher variance in individual effort (Cason et al., 2010;Dechenaux et al., 2015;van Dijk, Sonnemans, & van Winden, 2001).”

    From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests (2022) · cites this paper as Cason et al., 2010

    The Introduction (page unavailable) says winner-take-all incentives may produce greater variance in players’ effort than piece-rate wages. Section 2.2 (page unavailable) identifies the paper’s winner-take-all contest as an all-pay auction. The citing sentence overstates a qualified possibility as a general result for contests and tournaments, including designs beyond winner-take-all. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 34

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Authors
Cason, T. N., Masters, W. A., & Sheremeta, R. M.
Affiliations
  • Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
  • Chapman University (US)
Corresponding author
Cason, Timothy N.
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2010-10
Volume
94
Issue
9-10
Pages
604-611
ISSN
0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.006
OpenAlex
W2260046485
Cited by
257
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 19 · 2012: 12
FWCI
45.10
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Journal of Public Economics (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Chapman University Digital Commons (Chapman University) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Ecolab
  • University of Pittsburgh
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
contests, contest design, effort incentives, innovation contests

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