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Cited by 43Fiscal Policies and Political EconomyPublic Policy and Administration ResearchCorruption and Economic Development

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Bureaucrats under Populism

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Sasso, Greg, Morelli, Massimo·2021·Journal of Public Economics
DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104497
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Abstract

We explore the consequences of populism for bureaucrats' incentives by analyzing a model of delegated policymaking between politicians and bureaucrats. Populist politicians prefer a bureaucrat who implements their policy commitment, while non-populist politicians prefer a good bureaucrat with discretion. The presence of populist politicians thus determines replacement of good with bad bureaucrats and creates incentives for good bureaucrats to ``feign loyalty''. We show that feigning loyalty is more prevalent when the probability of populist leadership in the future is higher and the bureaucrats' pool of potential replacements is worse. We also show that bureaucratic turnover is higher under populists when the bureaucracy is strong and higher under non-populists when the bureaucracy is weak.

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 35

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Metadata

Authors
Sasso, G., & Morelli, M.
Affiliations
  • Emory University (US)
  • Bocconi University (IT)
Corresponding author
Sasso, Greg
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2021-10
Volume
202
Pages
104497
ISSN
0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104497
OpenAlex
W3197186837
Cited by
43
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3
FWCI
3.82
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Journal of Public Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Archivio istituzionale della Ricerca - Bocconi (submittedVersion)
  • SocArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • SocArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Funders
European Research Council
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
Keywords
populism, bureaucrats, bureaucratic incentives, policy commitment, administrative discretion, political leadership

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