The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Feedback and incentives: Experimental evidence
Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer effects in the piece-rate pay scheme. In contrast, in the tournament scheme we find some evidence of positive peer effects since the underdogs almost never quit the competition even when lagging significantly behind, and frontrunners do not slack off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work.
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Cites
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Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355301556400 · Cited by 5,276
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?
Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.122.3.1067 · Cited by 3,186
ARIELY, D., GNEEZY, U., LOEWENSTEIN, G., & MAZAR, N. (2009) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00534.x · Cited by 797
Cited by
A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition
Gill, D., & Prowse, V. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.469 · Cited by 673
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
The Dark Side of Competition for Status
Charness, G., Masclet, D., & Villeval, M. C. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1747 · Cited by 510
Self-citationAzmat, G., & Iriberri, N. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.04.001 · Cited by 390
Ever Failed, Try Again, Succeed Better: Results from a Randomized Educational Intervention on Grit
Alan, S., Boneva, T., & Ertac, S. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjz006 · Cited by 313
Metadata
- Authors
- Eriksson, T., Poulsen, A., & Villeval, M. C.
- Venue
- Labour Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-12
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 679-688
- ISSN
- 0927-5371 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122559861
- Cited by
- 230
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 23.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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