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Cited by 14

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

University prestige, performance evaluation, and promotion: Estimating the employer learning model using personnel datasets

Araki, Shota, Kawaguchi, Daiji, Onozuka, Yuki · 2016 · Labour Economics

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Citations

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Show all 4 references

Research works printed but not linked: 22

  1. Altonji, 2001, Employer learning and statistical discrimination, Q. J. Econ., 116, 313, 10.1162/003355301556329 · DOI · Paper page
  2. Araki, 2014, The promotion rule under imperfect observability of the employees ability, Theor. Econ. Lett., 4, 662, 10.4236/tel.2014.48084 · doi:10.4236/tel.2014.48084
  3. Ariga, 2006, Horizontal transfer, vertical promotion, and evolution of firm organization, J. Jpn. Int. Econ., 20, 20, 10.1016/j.jjie.2004.07.001 · doi:10.1016/j.jjie.2004.07.001
  4. Ariga, 1999, Fast track: is it in the genes? The promotion policy of a large Japanese firm, J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 38, 385, 10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00017-7 · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00017-7
  5. Baker, 1994, The internal economics of the firm: evidence from personnel data, Q. J. Econ., 109, 881, 10.2307/2118351 · DOI · Paper page
  6. Brilon, 2015, Job assignment with multivariate skills and the Peter principle, Labour Econ., 32, 112, 10.1016/j.labeco.2015.01.007 · doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2015.01.007
  7. Farber, 1996, Learning and wage dynamics, Q. J. Econ., 111, 1007, 10.2307/2946706 · DOI · Paper page
  8. Gibbons, 1991, Layoffs and lemons, J. Labor Econ., 9, 351, 10.1086/298273 · DOI · Paper page
  9. Gibbons, 1999, A theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms, Q. J. Econ., 114, 1321, 10.1162/003355399556287 · DOI · Paper page
  10. Gibbons, 2006, Enriching a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms, J. Labor Econ., 24, 59, 10.1086/497819 · DOI
  11. Heckman, 2006, The effects of cognitive and noncognitive abilities on labor market outcomes and social behavior, J. Labor Econ., 24, 411, 10.1086/504455 · DOI · Paper page
  12. Hu, 2011, Displacement, asymmetric information, and heterogeneous human capital, J. Labor Econ., 29, 113, 10.1086/656373 · DOI
  13. Kahn, 2013, Asymmetric information between employers, Am. Econ. J.: Appl. Econ., 5, 165
  14. Kahn, 2014, Employer learning, productivity and the earnings distribution: evidence from performance measures, Rev. Econ. Stud., 81, 1575, 10.1093/restud/rdu021 · DOI
  15. Lange, 2007, The speed of employer learning, J. Labor Econ., 25, 1, 10.1086/508730 · DOI · Paper page
  16. Lazear, 2004, The Peter principle: a theory of decline, J. Polit. Econ., 112, S141, 10.1086/379943 · DOI · Paper page
  17. Light, 2015, Employer learning and the importance of skills, J. Hum. Resour., 50, 72, 10.3368/jhr.50.1.72 · DOI
  18. Mansour, 2012, Does employer learning vary by occupation?, J. Labor Econ., 30, 415, 10.1086/663590 · DOI · Paper page
  19. Pinkston, 2009, A model of asymmetric employer learning with testable implications, Rev. Econ. Stud., 76, 367, 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00507.x · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00507.x
  20. Rao, 2016, Social effects in employer learning: an analysis of siblings, Labour Econ., 38, 24, 10.1016/j.labeco.2015.11.001 · doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2015.11.001
  21. Schönberg, 2007, Testing for asymmetric employer learning, J. Labor Econ., 25, 651, 10.1086/522905 · DOI
  22. Waldman, 1984, Job assignments, signalling, and efficiency, RAND J. Econ., 15, 255, 10.2307/2555679 · DOI · Paper page

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Araki, S., Kawaguchi, D., & Onozuka, Y.
Venue
Labour Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2016-08
Volume
41
Pages
135-148
ISSN
0927-5371
Cited by
14
References
4
Language
en
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.