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Cited by 995Intergenerational and Educational Inequality StudiesSchool Choice and PerformanceLabor market dynamics and wage inequality

Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables

Dale, S. B., Krueger, A. B.·2002·The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1162/003355302320935089
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Abstract

Estimates of the effect of college selectivity on earnings may be biased because elite colleges admit students, in part, based on characteristics that are related to future earnings. We matched students who applied to, and were accepted by, similar colleges to try to eliminate this bias. Using the College and Beyond data set and National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972, we find that students who attended more selective colleges earned about the same as students of seemingly comparable ability who attended less selective schools. Children from low-income families, however, earned more if they attended selective colleges.

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Crossref · 10.1162/003355302320935089

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1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The study uses a modified version of the Dale and Krueger (2002) method to control for student qualifications beyond those measured by high school GPA and test scores.

    “We use the information on the UC campuses to which students were admitted, and the quality of those UC campuses, to implement a modified version of the method used in Dale and Krueger (2002) to control for student qualifications beyond those measured by high school GPA and test scores.”

    From Affirmative action and university fit: evidence from Proposition 209 (2014) · cites this paper as Dale and Krueger (2002)

  • Failure to control for the full set of factors will likely result in biased estimates of the effects of attending more-selective colleges on the outcomes of interest.

    “As has been noted in the literature, 20 failure to control for the full set of factors will likely to result in biased estimates of the effects of attending more-selective colleges on the outcomes of interest.”

    From Affirmative action and university fit: evidence from Proposition 209 (2014) · cites this paper as Dale and Krueger (2002)

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Authors
Dale, S. B., & Krueger, A. B.
Affiliations
  • Mathematica Policy Research (US)
  • Princeton University (US)
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2002-11-01
Volume
117
Issue
4
Pages
1491-1527
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
DOI
10.1162/003355302320935089
OpenAlex
W2166257424
Cited by
995
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 28 · 2025: 43 · 2024: 35 · 2023: 53 · 2022: 51 · 2021: 50 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 48 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 41 · 2016: 63 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 62 · 2013: 54 · 2012: 58
FWCI
68.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Intergenerational and Educational Inequality Studies
  • Social Sciences › Education › School Choice and Performance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
Keywords
college selectivity, elite universities, earnings, returns to college, selection on observables, selection on unobservables, university admission, low-income students, student ability

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