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Cited by 102Philosophy and History of ScienceBayesian Modeling and Causal InferenceAdvanced Causal Inference Techniques

Causal discovery and the problem of psychological interventions

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Eronen, Markus I.·2020·New Ideas in Psychology
DOI 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2020.100785
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Abstract

Finding causes is a central goal in psychological research. In this paper, I argue based on the interventionist approach to causal discovery that the search for psychological causes faces great obstacles. Psychological interventions are likely to be fat-handed: they change several variables simultaneously, and it is not known to what extent such interventions give leverage for causal inference. Moreover, due to problems of measurement, the degree to which an intervention was fat-handed, or more generally, what the intervention in fact did, is difficult to reliably estimate. A further complication is that the causal findings in psychology are typically made at the population level, and such findings do not allow inferences to individual-level causal relationships. I also discuss the implications of these problems for research, as well as various ways of addressing them, such as focusing more on the discovery of robust but non-causal patterns.

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  • Media comparison studies that introduce new media alongside new instructional methods, interface designs, or activity structures fail to surgically remove or add the variable of interest without altering the broader instructional mix, rendering their results unfit for interpretation as intended.

    “Such studies fail to surgically remove or add the variable of interest without altering the broader instructional mix, rendering their results unfit for interpretation, at least in the way intended by their authors.”

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Authors
Eronen, M. I.
Affiliations
University of Groningen (NL)
Corresponding author
Eronen, Markus I.
ORCID
Eronen, Markus I.
Venue
New Ideas in Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2020-12
Volume
59
Pages
100785
ISSN
0732-118X (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.newideapsych.2020.100785
OpenAlex
W2899501248
Cited by
102
References
9
Citations by year
2026: 18 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 1
FWCI
34.36
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • New Ideas in Psychology (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
  • University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Advanced Causal Inference Techniques
Keywords
causal discovery, psychological intervention, interventionist approach, causal inference, measurement error

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