A Theory of Causation in the Social and Biological Sciences
Abstract
This first full length treatment of interventionist theories of causation in the social sciences, the biological sciences and other higher-level sciences the presents original counter arguments to rec
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Structural counterfactuals differentiate causal from noncausal relations without having to invoke reference to universal social and natural laws.
“Structural counterfactuals differentiate causal from noncausal relations without having to invoke reference to universal social and natural laws, which is notoriously problematic in the realm of the social sciences (George and Bennett 2005:chap. 7; Reutlinger 2013).”
From Check Your Truth Conditions! Clarifying the Relationship between Theories of Causation and Social Science Methods for Causal Inference (2021) · cites this paper as Reutlinger 2013
Applying regularity theory to the social sciences creates problems because universal laws are hard to come by.
“This creates problems in applying this theory to the social sciences, where universal laws are hard to come by (Reutlinger 2013:17).”
From Check Your Truth Conditions! Clarifying the Relationship between Theories of Causation and Social Science Methods for Causal Inference (2021) · cites this paper as Reutlinger 2013
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Reutlinger, A. (2016) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/687859 · Cited by 116 · see citing works
Self-citationCausal discovery and the problem of psychological interventions
Eronen, M. I. (2020) · New Ideas in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2020.100785 · Cited by 102 · see citing works
Rohlfing, I., & Zuber, C. I. (2021) · Sociological Methods & Research · doi:10.1177/0049124119826156 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Does the counterfactual theory of explanation apply to non-causal explanations in metaphysics?
Reutlinger, A. (2017) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-016-0155-z · Cited by 45 · see citing works
Self-citationGernigon, C., Hartigh, R. J. R. D., Vallacher, R. R., & van Geert, P. L. C. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916231187324 · Cited by 32 · see citing works
A Relic of a Bygone Age? Causation, Time Symmetry and the Directionality Argument
Farr, M., & Reutlinger, A. (2013) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9510-z · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Self-citationMetaphysical explanations and the counterfactual theory of explanation
Roski, S. (2020) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01518-8 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Do Statistical Laws Solve the ‘Problem of Provisos’?
Reutlinger, A. (2014) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9640-y · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Self-citationReutlinger, A. (2013) · International Studies in the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1080/02698595.2013.825497 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Self-citationThinking about Non-Universal Laws
Reutlinger, A., & Unterhuber, M. (2014) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9654-5 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Self-citationCausation and causal inference in obstetrics-gynecology
Dammann, O., Dörk, T., Hillemanns, P., & Reydon, T. A. C. (2022) · American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology · doi:10.1016/j.ajog.2021.09.047 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Causality in Philosophy; Philosophy in Psychology
Young, G. C. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-24094-7_4
Shan, Y. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192863485.003.0001
- Authors
- Reutlinger, A.
- Corresponding author
- Reutlinger, Alexander
- Venue
- Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks
- Publisher
- Palgrave Macmillan UK
- Published
- 2013
- OpenAlex
- W1634926855
- Cited by
- 14
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2016: 3 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 2
- FWCI
- 3.41
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Critical Realism in Sociology
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Keywords
- causal inference, social sciences, biology, counterfactual reasoning, causal models
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