Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a mathematical treatment of the costs and benefits of decisions can predict the optimal strategy in simple settings, more realistic settings such as finite populations, non-vanishing mutations rates, stochastic decisions, communication between agents, and spatial interactions, require agent-based methods where each agent is modeled as an individual, carries its own genes that determine its decisions, and where the evolutionary outcome can only be ascertained by evolving the population of agents forward in time. While highlighting standard mathematical results, we compare those to agent-based methods that can go beyond the limitations of equations and simulate the complexity of heterogeneous populations and an ever-changing set of interactors. We conclude that agent-based methods can predict evolutionary outcomes where purely mathematical treatments cannot tread (for example in the weak selection-strong mutation limit), but that mathematics is crucial to validate the computational simulations.
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Cites
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Cited by
Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI
Hammond, L., Chan, A., Clifton, J., Hoelscher-Obermaier, J., Khan, A., McLean, E., Smith, C., Barfuss, W., Foerster, J., Gavenčiak, T., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.14143 · Cited by 305
On the number of equilibria of the replicator-mutator dynamics for noisy social dilemmas
Chen, L., Deng, C., Duong, M. H., & Han, T. A. (2024) · Chaos, Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2024.114565 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Adami, C., Schossau, J., & Hintze, A.
- Venue
- Physics of Life Reviews
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016-12
- Volume
- 19
- Pages
- 1-26
- ISSN
- 1571-0645 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1935235554
- Cited by
- 221
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 53.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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