Capital structure, product market competition and firm performance: Evidence from South Africa
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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure and firm performance, paying particular attention to the degree of industry competition. The paper applies a novel measure of competition, the Boone indicator, to the leverage-performance relationship. Using panel data consisting of 257 South African firms over the period 1998–2009, this paper examines the effect of capital structure on firm performance and investigates the extent to which the relationship depends on the level of product market competition. The results suggest that financial leverage has a positive and significant effect on firm performance. It is also found that product market competition enhances the performance effect of leverage. The results are robust to alternative measures of competition and leverage.
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Citations
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InfluentialSHAREHOLDERS AS AGENTS AND PRINCIPALS: THE CASE FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
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InfluentialSOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION POLICYPreprint
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“…= a + β1EQ + β2DB + μi---------- 1) Where: BP = Bank Performance as measure by PBT EQ= Bank Equity finance DB= Bank Debt finance μi = random or stochastic term (error term) is used in this study as similar studies Fosu (2013) in South Africa, Abor (2007) in Ghana used it in similar studies.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fosu, S.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-05
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 140-151
- ISSN
- 1062-9769 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2072282899
- Cited by
- 250
- References
- 55
- FWCI
- 50.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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