Religion is natural, atheism is not: On why everybody is both right and wrong
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
After discussing evidence of irreligion and the rise of the so called “New Atheism”, the authors refute the claim that this poses a problem for the cognitive science of religion and its hypothesis that religion is natural. The “naturalness hypothesis” is not deterministic but probabilistic and thus leaves room for atheism. This, the authors maintain, is true of both the by‐product and adaptationist stances within the cognitive science of religion. In this context the authors also discuss the memetic or “unnaturalness” hypothesis, i.e. that religion is a “virus of the mind”. The authors criticize accounts of atheism offered by cognitive scientists of religion as being based on unfounded assumptions about the psychology of atheists, and object to the notion that the natural aspects of religion by corollary make atheism unnatural. By considering human cognition in a semiotic framework and emphasizing its natural ability to take part in semiotic systems of signs, atheism emerges as a natural, cognitive strategy. The authors argue that to reach a fuller account of religion, the cognitive (naturalness) and memetic (unnaturalness) hypotheses of religion must be merged. Finally, a preliminary analysis of the “New Atheism” is offered in terms of semiotic and cognitive dynamics
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“On the other hand, models viewing religious belief and disbelief as arising from a complex combination of factors (Geertz & Markússon, 2010;Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013)-including cognitive constraints and style, motivation, and especially cultural learning-can accommodate a much wider range of atheism rates.”
From How many atheists are there? (2017) · cites this paper as Geertz & Markússon, 2010
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Citations
Cites
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“Having a theory of mind is characterized by neurologists Gallagher & Frith as ‘our ability to explain and predict other people’s behaviour by attributing to them independent mental states, such as beliefs and desires’ (Gallagher and Frith, 2003, p. 77).”
BackgroundGrounding conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems
Barsalou, L. W., Kyle Simmons, W., Barbey, A. K., & Wilson, C. D. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)00029-3 · Cited by 1,256
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Barrett, J. L. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01419-9 · Cited by 818
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Signaling, solidarity, and the sacred: The evolution of religious behavior
Sosis, R., & Alcorta, C. (2003) · Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews · doi:10.1002/evan.10120 · Cited by 699
Cooperation and Commune Longevity: A Test of the Costly Signaling Theory of Religion
Sosis, R., & Bressler, E. R. (2003) · Cross-Cultural Research · doi:10.1177/1069397103037002003 · Cited by 569 · cited 1×
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Cited by
The cultural evolution of prosocial religions
Norenzayan, A., Shariff, A. F., Gervais, W. M., Willard, A. K., McNamara, R. A., Slingerland, E., & Henrich, J. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x14001356 · Cited by 934
The origins of religious disbelief
Norenzayan, A., & Gervais, W. M. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.11.006 · Cited by 320
Maij, D. L. R., van Harreveld, F., Gervais, W., Schrag, Y., Mohr, C., & van Elk, M. (2017) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0182764 · Cited by 110
“Others acknowledge a strong reciprocal influence between cognitive biases and cultural factors [12,52].”
BackgroundThe importance of religious displays for belief acquisition and secularization
Lanman, J. A. (2012) · Journal of Contemporary Religion · doi:10.1080/13537903.2012.642726 · Cited by 105
Introductory essay: Evolutionary science and the study of religion
Slingerland, E., & Bulbulia, J. (2011) · Religion · doi:10.1080/0048721x.2011.604513 · Cited by 26
“There is no principled reason to restrict the evolutionary study of religion to genetic systems, and many evolutionary researchers use a naturalized conception of ‘culture’ to explain the systems that express and conserve religions (Geertz and Markusson 2010; Gervais et al. 2011).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Geertz, A. W., & Markússon, G. I.
- Venue
- Religion
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-07
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 152-165
- ISSN
- 0048-721X (ISSN-L)
- 1096-1151
- OpenAlex
- W2037828104
- Cited by
- 62
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 57.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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