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Cited by 569Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorViolence, Religion, and Philosophy

Cooperation and Commune Longevity: A Test of the Costly Signaling Theory of Religion

Sosis, Richard, Bressler, Eric R.·2003·Cross-Cultural Research
DOI 10.1177/1069397103037002003
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Abstract

The costly signaling theory of religion posits that religious rituals and taboos can promote intragroup cooperation, which is argued to be the primary adaptive benefit of religion. To test this theory, the authors collected historical data on the constraints and ritual requirements that eighty-three 19th-century U.S. communes imposed on their members. All communes must solve the collective action problem of cooperative labor to survive; thus, they are an ideal population to assess the impact of ritual and taboo on intragroup cooperation. The authors evaluated whether communes that imposed costlier requirements survived longer than less demanding communes and whether costly requirements and religiosity interact to promote cooperation. The results support aspects of the costly signaling theory of religion and reveal new avenues for its development. The authors discuss some of the shortcomings of the theory and explore ways to expand the theory that incorporate additional features of ritual and religious belief.

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Crossref · 10.1177/1069397103037002003

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64 of 64 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Historical evidence shows that religious groups that have costly rituals are more successful.

    “and historical evidence shows that religious groups that have costly rituals are more successful (Sosis & Bressler, 2003).”

    From The Psychology of Rituals: An Integrative Review and Process-Based Framework (2018) · cites this paper as Sosis & Bressler, 2003

  • Empirical evidence for costly signaling theory includes analysis of historical communes in the US, which were more likely to survive if religious, and strict religious communes were more likely to survive than less strict groups.

    “Empirical evidence for the costly signaling theory includes an analysis of historical communes in the US, which were more likely to survive if they were religious: strict religious communes (with more prohibitions on food, sex, etc.) were more likely to survive than less strict groups (Sosis & Bressler, 2003).”

    From The Challenge of Evolution to Religion (2019) · cites this paper as Sosis & Bressler, 2003

  • Longevity for religious communes was positively related to the magnitude of the costly acts required for membership within a commune.

    “Sosis and Bressler (2003) found that longevity for religious communes was positively related to the magnitude of the costly acts required for membership within a commune (e.g., restriction from alcohol and sex).”

    From Parasite-stress promotes in-group assortative sociality: The cases of strong family ties and heightened religiosity (2012) · cites this paper as Sosis and Bressler 2003

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Authors
Sosis, R., & Bressler, E. R.
Affiliations
  • University of Connecticut (US)
  • McMaster University (CA)
ORCID
Sosis, Richard
Venue
Cross-Cultural Research
Publisher
SAGE Publications
Published
2003-05
Volume
37
Issue
2
Pages
211-239
ISSN
  • 0094-3673 (ISSN-L)
  • 1069-3971
  • 1552-3578
DOI
10.1177/1069397103037002003
OpenAlex
W2044683788
Cited by
569
References
74
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 36 · 2021: 34 · 2020: 64 · 2019: 39 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 34 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 22 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 24 · 2012: 24
FWCI
37.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
Locations
Cross-Cultural Research (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Violence, Religion, and Philosophy
Keywords
religious rituals, taboos, communes, collective action, religious constraints, religious beliefs

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