Communication during aggressive interactions with particular reference to variation in choice of behaviour
Integrity signals
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The Sir Philip Sidney game was developed by Maynard Smith as a way to model signalling within animal behaviour, and the aim of the model was to illustrate the mechanisms of honest signalling initially proposed by Zahavi and subsequently developed by others.
“The Sir Philip Sidney game was developed by Maynard Smith as a way to model signalling within animal behaviour [12] -in particular, the aim of the model was to illustrate the mechanisms of honest signalling initially proposed by Zahavi [3,9] and subsequently developed by others [10,47].”
From Maynard Smith revisited: A multi-agent reinforcement learning approach to the coevolution of signalling behaviour (2025) · cites this paper as [47]
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When will evolution lead to deceptive signaling in the Sir Philip Sidney game?
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- Authors
- Enquist, M.
- Affiliations
- Stockholm University (SE)
- Corresponding author
- Enquist, Magnus
- ORCID
- Enquist, Magnus
- Venue
- Animal Behaviour
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1985-11
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1152-1161
- ISSN
- 0003-3472 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2026027420
- Cited by
- 328
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 13
- FWCI
- 4.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Animal Behaviour (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- aggressive communication, signaling, evolutionary stability, war of attrition, fighting ability, local strategies, resource value, animal communication
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