The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why are different features central for natural kinds and artifacts?: the role of causal status in determining feature centrality
Open accessAbstract
Ahn and Lassaline [Ahn, W., Lassaline, M.E., 1995. Causal structure in categorization. Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Pittsburgh, PA, pp. 521-526] recently proposed a causal status hypothesis which states that features that play a causal role in a relational structure are more central than their effects. This hypothesis can account for previous research demonstrating that compositional features are generally important for natural kinds but functional features are generally important for artifacts. The causal status hypothesis explains this category-feature interaction effect in terms of differences in the causal status of compositional and functional features between natural kinds and artifacts. Experiments 1 and 2 examined real-life categories used in previous studies, and found positive correlations between the causal status of the features and their centrality across natural and artifactual kinds. Experiments 3 and 4 manipulated the causal status of compositional and functional features in artificial categories, and showed that it was causal status rather than the interaction between the type of feature and the type of category per se that accounted for feature centrality. The implications of these results on the distinctions between natural kinds and artifacts are discussed.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028
Context theory of classification learning
Medin, D. L., & Schaffer, M. M. (1978) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.85.3.207 · Cited by 3,061
Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development
Keil, F. C. (1989) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2065.001.0001 · Cited by 1,886
Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture
(1994) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511752902 · Cited by 685
Comments on Part I: Psychological essentialism
Medin, D., & Ortony, A. (1989) · Similarity and Analogical Reasoning · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511529863.009 · Cited by 674
Cited by
Keil, F. C. (2006) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190100 · Cited by 1,350
The Essential Child: Origins of Essentialism in Everyday Thought
Gelman, S. A. (2003) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195154061.001.0001 · Cited by 1,247
The parallel distributed processing approach to semantic cognition
McClelland, J. L., & Rogers, T. T. (2003) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn1076 · Cited by 795
Humphreys, G. W., & Forde, E. M. E. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01004150 · Cited by 499
Learning from Others: Children's Construction of Concepts
Gelman, S. A. (2009) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093659 · Cited by 412
Metadata
- Authors
- Ahn, W.-K.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1998-12
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 135-178
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2009367222
- Cited by
- 246
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 10.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Why are different features central for natural kinds and artifacts?: the role of causal status in determining feature centrality. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0010-0277(98)00063-8
- The paper
- Ahn, W.-K. (1998). Why are different features central for natural kinds and artifacts?: the role of causal status in determining feature centrality. Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(98)00063-8
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.