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Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data

Laffont, Jean-Jacques·1997·European Economic Review

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Metadata

Authors
Laffont, J.-J.
Venue
European Economic Review
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1997-01
Volume
41
Issue
1
Pages
1-35
ISSN
0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2086987066
Cited by
195
References
2
FWCI
8.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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