The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions
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Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Myerson, R. B. (1981) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58 · Cited by 5,920
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
Holmstrom, B., & Myerson, R. B. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912117 · Cited by 670
Cassady, R. (1967) · University of California Press eBooks · doi:10.1525/9780520322257 · Cited by 517
Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey,Preprint
Engelbrecht‐Wiggans, R. (1979) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 151
Cited by
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., & Vuong, Q. (2000) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00123 · Cited by 710
Introduction to Experimental Economics
Roth, A. E. (2020) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvzsmff5.5 · Cited by 268
Metadata
- Authors
- Graham, D. A., & Marshall, R. C.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1987-12
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1217-1239
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2139311641
- Cited by
- 428
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 5.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/261512
- The paper
- Graham, D. A., & Marshall, R. C. (1987). Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261512
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.