Cited by 221Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsPsychology of Social InfluenceExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Framing effects: An analytic–holistic perspective

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McElroy, Todd, Seta, John J.·2003·Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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Crossref · 10.1016/s0022-1031(03)00036-2

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  • In the Asian disease problem and replications, the majority of participants will select their program choices based on how the information regarding lives saved/fatalities rates is framed.

    “Consistently, the majority of participants will select their program choices based on how the information regarding lives saved/fatalities rates is framed [28,70,72-74].”

    From Rationality versus reality: the challenges of evidence-based decision making for health policy makers (2010) · cites this paper as [72]

    The Results and discussion of Experiment 1 (page not provided) report that gain/loss framing affected choices when the task had low relevance. The same section reports no framing effect when the task had high relevance, so the unqualified claim that the majority will choose based on framing overstates the paper's findings. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Prospect theory demonstrates that a decision maker's perceived utility can be subjectively influenced by the manner in which the information is framed (as a loss/gain or risk/no risk), what reference is being used to evaluate the options, and the relationship/salience of the alternative to the decision maker.

    “Prospect theory, however, demonstrates that a decision maker's perceived utility can be subjectively influenced by the manner in which the information is framed (as a loss/gain or risk/no risk), what reference is being used to evaluate the options, and the relationship/salience of the alternative to the decision maker [47,70-74].”

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Research works printed but not linked: 25

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Authors
McElroy, T., & Seta, J. J.
Affiliations
University of North Carolina at Greensboro (US)
Corresponding author
McElroy, Todd
Venue
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2003-11
Volume
39
Issue
6
Pages
610-617
ISSN
0022-1031 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2114750553
Cited by
221
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 3
FWCI
4.61
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • NC Digital Online Collection of Knowledge and Scholarship (The University of North Carolina at Greensboro) (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion)
  • Appalachian State University
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Psychology of Social Influence
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
framing effects, analytical processing, holistic processing, heuristic processing, decision-making, cognitive style

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